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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
ANALYSTS’ EPS FORECAST REVISIONS AFTER REPURCHASE 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
Analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are one of the most widely used 
indicators of firm performance by market participants and firm executives. There are two 
components in EPS forecasts, but prior literature almost invariably focuses on the net 
income component (numerator) and ignores the shares outstanding component 
(denominator). Changes in shares outstanding mechanically alter EPS forecasts due to a 
changed denominator. These mechanical changes in EPS forecasts, however, do not reflect 
a firm’s real performance. Therefore, it is important to understand analysts’ share 
adjustment behaviors in order to better interpret analysts’ EPS revisions after share 
changing events. This paper uses the setting of open market repurchase (OMR) 
announcements to explore analysts’ share adjustment behaviors. The main findings include 
that, first, when analysts revise EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements, they adjust 
the denominator downward based on their estimates of the number of shares to be 
repurchased by the firms; and the number of days that analysts follow the repurchase firms 
and the uncertainties of repurchase announcements influence analysts’ share adjustment 
behaviors. Second, the numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions, which remove the 
mechanical denominator-driven revisions, are more predictive of a firm’s future operating 
performance than the actual EPS forecast revisions as reported by analysts. Lastly, market 
participants fail to process the implications of the denominator-driven EPS forecast 
revisions. 
 
KEYWORDS: Open market repurchases, repurchase announcements, analyst forecasts, 
denominator-driven EPS forecast revisions, operating performance, and 
market reactions. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Market participants and firm executives regard sell-side financial analysts as highly 
sophisticated professionals and rely on their forecasts to make decisions. Earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts are one of the most extensively used forecasts. There are two components 
in EPS: net income available to shareholders (the numerator) and weighted average number 
of shares outstanding (the denominator).1 Therefore, analysts’ EPS forecast revisions are 
driven by both the numerator and denominator forecast changes. However, prior analyst 
forecast literature almost exclusively focuses on the factors that influence the net income 
(the numerator) component of EPS forecasts, such as cash flows, accruals, revenues and 
expenses, but virtually ignores the outstanding shares (the denominator) component of EPS 
forecasts.2 This paper takes the first step to examine analysts’ EPS forecast behaviors, with 
a focus on their forecasts of the changes in outstanding shares after a share changing event, 
thereby shedding light on how and why analyst forecast users should properly interpret 
analysts’ EPS forecast revisions after share changing events. 
In this paper, I examine analysts’ EPS forecast revisions in the open market 
repurchase (OMR) announcement setting for the following reasons. First, there is a 
dramatic increase in share repurchases recently. The money firms recently spent on 
repurchases reached a historic high – U.S. companies spent $1 trillion in 2018 on buying 
 
1 Throughout this paper, I label the numerator of EPS as net income. As in most academic papers and media 
articles, earnings are used interchangeably with EPS. 
2 To my best knowledge, two papers mention the outstanding share component in analysts’ EPS forecasts. 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) examine analysts’ EPS revisions after 127 announcements of stock repurchase tender 
offers during the sample period 1970-1984. They use the change in shares as a control variable and find that 
Value Line does not mechanically adjust the shares changes in the one-year-ahead EPS forecasts. Green et 
al. (2016) examine 120 real discounted cash flow (DCF) spreadsheets and document a 15% error rate in 
analysts’ outstanding share inputs in the spreadsheets.  
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back their own shares (Ivanova 2018; Cox 2019). Second, OMRs are generally treated as 
positive events as firms conduct OMRs because of undervaluation or to avoid 
overinvestments. However, OMRs recently attracted intense scrutiny from the public for 
being responsible for reduced employment and investment and for being used by insiders 
for personal gains (Almeida et al. 2016; Cox 2019). Therefore, the purpose of announced 
OMR is difficult for investors to ascertain. Third, the actual number of shares repurchased 
and the repurchase prices are not available until 10Q/10K release dates or earnings 
announcement dates. Firms generally do not disclose detailed repurchase plan in their 
OMR announcements, and they are not legally required to follow their announced OMR 
plans, which creates a difficulty for market participants to estimate the actual shares to be 
repurchased. Overall, given the significant economic consequences and high uncertainties 
associated with OMRs, analysts’ interpretations of OMR announcements are especially 
informative to investors.  
This study first empirically examines whether analysts adjust their estimations of 
outstanding shares when they revise EPS forecasts after OMR announcements and explores 
some conditions that influence analysts’ share forecasts. While it is difficult for analysts to 
forecast shares to be repurchased after OMR announcements, they have incentives to make 
the estimation to generate an accurate EPS forecast. EPS forecasts are sensitive to changes 
in shares outstanding – a 1% change in the number of shares outstanding can lead to around 
a 1% change in EPS forecasts assuming no changes in the numerator. In other words, even 
with perfect net income predictions, analysts may generate significant forecast errors if 
they ignore the share changes in their EPS forecasts. To facilitate the role of information 
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intermediaries and to reduce forecast errors, analysts have incentives to incorporate the 
share changes in their EPS forecast revisions after an event that triggers share changes.  
To examine analysts’ share adjustment behaviors, I utilize the I/B/E/S detailed 
forecast file and the SDC database to calculate individual analysts’ EPS forecast revisions 
after repurchase announcements during 2005-2018. EPS forecast revisions after repurchase 
announcements are measured as the differences between individual analysts’ last EPS 
forecasts before the OMR announcement dates and their first EPS forecasts after the OMR 
announcement dates. I focus on the one-quarter-ahead EPS forecast because this forecast 
horizon is relevant to the most recent forecast period and is widely used by market 
participants. This paper finds that following OMR announcements, analysts indeed adjust 
their forecasts of shares outstanding downward based on their estimated number of shares 
to be repurchased when revising EPS forecasts. In addition, this study shows that the 
number of days analysts following a firm and the uncertainty level of an OMR 
announcement both influence analysts’ share forecast behaviors.  
Next, this study tests whether investors should remove the denominator-driven 
effects from EPS forecast revisions and use only the numerator-driven EPS forecast 
revisions in evaluating firms’ performance. A CNBC report from Pisani (2017) discusses 
the repurchases by some “buyback monster” companies, and it alerts investors that those 
companies “have dramatically boosted their earnings, not by selling more stuff, but by 
buying back stock. The lesson: stock buybacks can boost earnings, but without underlying 
fundamentals, it’s not worth chasing them.” The “Earnings” mentioned in this CNBC 
report is earnings per share. EPS forecast revisions are induced by both numerator and 
denominator modifications. The denominator-driven EPS revision, however, is induced by 
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a different outstanding share amount because of repurchases, and this change is mechanical 
and does not reflect a firm’s fundamental changes. As expected, I find that comparing with 
the actual EPS forecast revisions as reported by analysts, the numerator-driven EPS 
forecast revisions, which removes the denominator-driven or mechanical EPS revisions 
from the actual EPS forecast revisions, better predict a firm’s future operating 
performance.3  
Further, this paper explores whether investors recognize and process the 
implications of the denominator-drive EPS forecast revisions. Although analyst EPS 
forecast revisions include the mechanical adjustments induced by denominator changes 
and only the numerator-driven revisions reflect a firm’s future performance, investors may 
employ the actual EPS forecasts as reported by analysts to make investment decisions. 
Previous literature provides evidence of market participants’ failures of scaled thinking. 
Cedergren and Marshall (2019) document a market failure to process the denominator-
driven changes to EPS released by firms at earnings announcement dates, likely resulting 
in an economically significant mispricing. Without distinguishing the denominator-driven 
mechanical and numerator-driven fundamental portions from analysts’ reported EPS 
forecasts, users may reach unreliable conclusions. As anticipated, this paper finds that 
investors fail to process the denominator-driven EPS forecast revisions when they make 
investment decisions. If investors take short or long positions based on the portfolio formed 
by the denominator-driven EPS forecast revisions, they can receive a three to ten percent 
 
3 The denominator-driven or mechanical EPS revisions = the actual EPS forecast revisions – the 
numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions.  
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abnormal return in the three to twelve month periods after analysts report their EPS 
forecasts.  
This study provides some additional findings. First, although the numerator-driven 
EPS revisions better predict a firm’s future performance, analysts rely more on their actual 
EPS forecast revisions than the numerator-driven EPS revisions in their price target 
forecasts, which is associated with an over-estimation of stock prices. Second, comparing 
with the numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions, I find that the actual forecast revisions 
as reported by analysts are relatively more informative in predicting actual EPS. Third, I 
examine whether analysts estimate share changes based on repurchases when the actual 
number of shares repurchased are released in earnings announcements. I find evidence that 
analysts routinely update their shares outstanding estimations and impound their 
expectations of repurchases into their forecasts after they receive new information about 
the actual shares repurchased. This paper is the first to provide initial evidence that analysts 
on average do consider the effects of shares repurchased on EPS forecasts. Finally, I utilize 
a sample of individual analysts providing multiple forecasts that enable me to back out the 
number of shares they use in their forecasts to validate the method used in this paper to 
proxy analysts’ estimates of outstanding share changes.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with my main conjecture that, on average, 
analysts adjust the denominator of their EPS forecasts downward based on the estimated 
number of shares to be repurchased following an OMR announcement. To better predict 
future operation performance, analyst EPS forecast users should exclude the denominator-
driven forecasts. Also, investors fail to incorporate the denominator-driven revisions into 
their investment decision making process.  
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This paper makes both academic and practical contributions. It expands our 
understanding of whether and how analysts revise their estimated number of shares 
outstanding after a significant corporate event – OMR announcement. Using the OMR 
announcement setting, I document that analysts use forecasted repurchases to adjust both 
the net income and the shares outstanding components in their EPS forecasts. This paper 
highlights the necessity to use the numerator-driven EPS forecast number, instead of the 
actual EPS forecast number as reported by analysts, in evaluating and predicting a firm’s 
operating performance after a share changing event. Moreover, since this paper studies the 
one-quarter-ahead analyst forecast revisions, where the period for firms to repurchase 
shares and thus the estimated number of shares to be repurchased is relatively small 
comparing with longer period forecasts, the results in this study have smaller power. 
Therefore, analysts’ share adjustment behaviors identified in this paper are generalizable 
to other forecast periods. 
Also, unlike typical disclosures which result in increased transparency, repurchase 
announcements lead to increased information asymmetry as evidenced by the conflicting 
opinions regarding their legitimacy. The results documented in this paper shed light on 
how the market, as broadly defined, may use analysts’ revision behaviors to better interpret 
OMR announcements. For example, market participants should use analysts’ actual EPS 
forecasts to predict firms’ actual EPS, but they should use the numerator-driven EPS 
forecasts to evaluate firms’ real performance to make long-term investment decisions. It is 
also informative to market participants to provide further evidence of the consequences of 
failing to process the denominator-drive EPS forecast revisions.  
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Finally, when public media provide analyst forecasts and when firms compare their 
earnings with analyst forecasts, most of them only provide the EPS number, instead of the 
numerator and denominator components of the EPS forecasts.4 In response to the call for 
academia to provide strong implications in our research, this paper suggests that when 
analysts, firms and the general public media report or use the EPS forecast number, they 
should look through both the EPS number and its net income and shares components used 
to derive the number, especially for the events with information changing both net income 
and shares, such as the repurchase announcement event. It would be more informative if 
they can disclose the EPS effects because of the denominator changes.  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides 
literature review and develop hypotheses. Chapter 3 illustrates sample construction and key 
variable definition. Chapter 4 demonstrates research methods, summary statistics and 
empirical results. Chapter 5 provides some additional analysis results. Finally, Chapter 6 
concludes this study and provides implications for practice and future research.  
  
 
4 For example, Yahoo Finance provides rich analyst earnings forecast information, including the high, low 
and average forecast and the number of analysts with upward or downward EPS revisions. However, the 
website users cannot figure out how much of the EPS forecasts and revision directions are driven by 
numerator versus denominator forecast changes. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Analyst Forecasts 
Market participants and management regard sell-side financial analysts as highly 
sophisticated professionals and rely on their forecasts to make decisions. Executives rate 
analysts’ recommendations and forecasts as one of the strongest forces influencing stock 
prices (Graham et al. 2005). There are many events that can trigger analysts’ forecasts, 
including (1) firm-level events such as earnings announcements, mergers and acquisitions, 
divestitures, new products announcements, restructurings, dividend declarations, and 
repurchase announcements; (2) macro-level events, such as exchange rate changes; and (3) 
regulations, such as Reg FD passage and tax law changes (Ramnath et al. 2008; Brauer and 
Wiersema 2018). There is a large body of literature examining the outputs provided by 
analysts, including forecasts for short-term and long-term earnings, long-term growth rates, 
target prices, stock recommendations, and cost of equity capital (Brav and Lehavy 2003; 
Hong and Kubik 2003; Bradshaw 2004; Balakrishnan et al. 2018). Among all those 
outputs, EPS forecasts are the most extensively examined outputs in the literature. For 
example, EPS forecasts have been used to understand analysts’ decision-making processes, 
to evaluate analysts’ abilities, to proxy for firms’ information environments, to measure 
earnings pressures, and to provide information to market participants (Ramnath et al. 2008; 
Zhang and Gimeno 2016). 
However, prior literature almost invariably focuses on the factors that impact the 
numerator of EPS forecasts (net income) such as cash flows, accruals, revenues, and 
expenses (Ertimur et al. 2003; Melendrez et al. 2008). Although the denominator of EPS 
forecasts (the number of shares outstanding) is another component of EPS forecasts, the 
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investigation of the denominator’s impact on analysts’ EPS forecasts is scarce at best. 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) examine analysts’ forecasts after tender offer announcements and 
find that Value Line does not mechanically adjust outstanding share changes in short-term 
EPS forecasts after tender offer announcements. Green et al. (2016) examine 120 real 
discounted cash flow (DCF) spreadsheets used by analysts and find that there is a 15% 
error rate related to the number of outstanding shares used in forecasts. The error here is 
defined as a more than 3% difference from the outstanding common shares per Compustat. 
If their samples were limited to firms with changes in common share or used a smaller 
deviation rate to define error, I argue that the error rate related to outstanding shares used 
in EPS forecasts would have been larger.  
In summary, analyst’s EPS forecast is a widely used indicator by management and 
the general market. Although there are two components in the EPS calculation, prior 
literature focuses on the numerator component (net income), ignoring the denominator 
component (the number of shares outstanding). Examining whether and how analysts 
update the number of shares outstanding in their forecasts can enrich our understandings 
of analysts’ EPS forecast behaviors.  
2.2 Repurchase Announcements and Analysts’ EPS Revisions 
Stock repurchases have become increasingly popular and attracted extensive 
attention from both practice and academia. There is a debate about whether repurchases 
are positive or negative events. Skeptics of repurchases believe that firms use repurchases 
to benefit executives or large shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders. For 
instance, the SEC commissioner Robert Jackson and senator Chris Van Hollen both 
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criticized corporate insiders’ opportunistic trading behaviors around repurchase 
announcements and called for restrictions on such behaviors. Hribar et al. (2006) find that 
firms use repurchases opportunistically to meet or beat analyst EPS forecasts, and that the 
market discounts the repurchase-induced earnings surprises. Kim and Ng (2017) further 
find that firms’ opportunistic repurchase behaviors are more likely when firms offer 
executives EPS-based bonuses. Chen and Wang (2012) discover that even financially 
constrained firms conduct share repurchases and that these firms display poor post-buyback 
returns and performances. Almeida et al. (2016) use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
and find that firms that conduct EPS-driven repurchases reduce employment and 
investment after repurchases. Senators Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders proposed to 
restrict corporate share buybacks unless firms meet certain employment requirements. On 
the other hand, supporters of repurchases believe that firms have legitimate reasons to 
conduct repurchases and the negative consequences are not because of repurchases. Firms 
generally announce repurchases to send positive signals. The reasons for repurchases 
include signaling firm undervaluation, showing managements’ confidence in their firms’ 
future performances, returning excess cash to investors to avoid overinvestments, and 
improving financial ratios. Also, some researchers do not see evidence of a drop in the 
overall investment in the economy when there are extensive repurchases (Fried and Wang 
2018). Overall, the market generally interprets repurchase announcements as positive 
signals (Lie 2005), but the documented opportunistic repurchase behaviors and the public 
scrutiny of repurchases create a sense of uncertainty related to repurchase announcement 
activities. That is, it is hard for the market to ascertain whether a repurchase announcement 
is a positive or negative event. 
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When there is high uncertainty, the market relies more on analysts’ forecasts (Loh 
and Stulz 2018), which makes the understanding of how analysts interpret repurchase 
announcements an important topic. Hertzel and Jain (1991) find that analysts revise their 
EPS forecasts upward after tender offer announcements, and Bartov (1991) find the same 
upward EPS revisions after OMR announcements. On the contrary, Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) document negative EPS revisions after OMR announcements, and O'Brien (2014) 
finds no post-OMR announcement EPS revisions after correcting for performance related 
biases. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) discover that analyst forecasts are pessimistic before 
repurchases and are not revised after repurchase announcements. Kurt (2018) uses the 
accelerated share repurchases (ASR) setting and find that analysts first revise EPS forecasts 
upward after ASR announcements and then revise forecasts downward when approaching 
firms’ earnings announcement dates. In general, prior literature presents mixed findings 
regarding whether analysts interpret repurchase announcements as positive or negative 
events.  
 A limitation common to all the above literature is that these studies only examine 
the factors that may affect the net income forecast, the numerator of EPS forecasts. 
However, repurchase announcements not only provide information related to net income, 
but also contain non-operating performance information related to repurchase 
implementations, which reduces the denominator of EPS forecasts. Therefore, the smaller 
denominator of EPS due to shares repurchased mechanically increases EPS forecasts if 
analysts incorporate shares repurchased in their forecasts. As information intermediaries 
that monitor financial information for investors, analysts are supposed to incorporate the 
information related to both net income (the numerator) and shares outstanding (the 
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denominator) from repurchase announcements to update their EPS forecasts. In analysts’ 
valuation models, the number of shares outstanding is one input that they use to make EPS 
forecasts (Green et al. 2016). However, unlike stock split or stock dividend events, it is 
impossible to know the actual number of shares to be repurchased during analysts’ forecast 
periods.5 In addition, a unique feature about repurchases is that firms are not required to 
implement repurchases after announcements or carry through the announced plans. In fact, 
Bonaimé (2015) documents the existence of false signalers who use repurchase 
announcements to boost stock prices without actually repurchasing the announced shares. 
One online analyst forecast training website – Wall Street Prep – shows that forecasting 
shares to be repurchased is most complex and is a challenge to analysts (WallStreetPrep). 
Therefore, it is hard for analysts to estimate shares to be repurchased after the repurchase 
announcements, and it is possible that analysts may ignore shares to be repurchased in their 
EPS forecasts after the repurchase announcements. 
 In summary, there is a high uncertainty regarding whether a repurchase 
announcement is a positive or negative event, and so analysts’ interpretations of the 
repurchase announcement are informative. Prior literature produces mixed findings of 
whether analysts treat the event as positive or negative, but that literature focuses primarily 
on the net income component (the numerator) of EPS forecasts. Repurchase 
announcements also provide information regarding the share component (the denominator) 
of EPS forecasts. Analysts are expected to update their share estimates after the repurchase 
announcements as well. Failing to consider the possibility of analysts adjusting the share 
 
5 The actual number of shares repurchased is released at earnings announcements or in 10K/10Q filings after 
earnings announcements. 
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component in their EPS forecasts may produce a misuse of analyst EPS forecasts by 
investors and other analyst forecast users.  
2.3 Hypotheses Developments 
A primary explanation for observed positive stock price reactions to stock 
repurchases is that repurchase announcements convey favorable information about the 
future prospects of the firm (Hertzel and Jain 1991). This information hypothesis suggests 
that analysts should revise their forecasts and recommendations after repurchase 
announcements (Hertzel and Jain 1991). In addition, there may be a higher demand for 
analysts to synthesize the additional information when firms increase disclosure (Boone 
and White 2015). Repurchase announcements provide new information about changes in 
shares outstanding, so analysts should revise their estimates of shares outstanding, based 
on the expected number of shares to be repurchased after repurchase announcements. 
Simkovic (2009) tracks repurchases for 20 months after repurchase announcements and 
finds an 80.3% completion rate in 2004. Huang and Zhang (2015) and Lie (2005) also 
mention that although announced OMR plans may be executed over a period of one to 
three years, firms typically start actual repurchasing right after repurchase announcements. 
Wall Street Prep recommends that analysts forecast the number of shares to be repurchased 
when making EPS forecasts, especially for regular large repurchase firms 
(WallStreetPrep). Overall, although it is difficult to estimate the number of shares to be 
repurchased during the forecast period, given the routine repurchase implementations after 
announcements in the past for an announcing firm, I expect that analysts are incentivized 
to estimate the number of shares to be repurchased when making EPS forecasts after the 
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firm’s repurchase announcement. Such adjustments to shares outstanding by analysts can 
reduce their forecast errors or increase forecast accuracy. My first hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H1: Analysts revise their estimated number of shares outstanding downward based on their 
estimates of the number of shares to be repurchased when they revise EPS forecasts after 
repurchase announcements. 
 
 In my second hypothesis, I examine whether analysts’ estimated number of shares 
outstanding after repurchase announcements vary across two dimensions: manager-analyst 
relationships and repurchase announcement uncertainty. First, I investigate the impact of 
analyst-manager relationships on the revised number of shares outstanding. On the one 
hand, prior literature finds that analysts opportunistically forecast smaller EPS so that it is 
easier for managers to beat the EPS forecast targets. For example, Berger et al. (2018) find 
that analysts sometimes omit positive information from their EPS forecasts to facilitate 
beatable forecast targets. Cen et al. (2016) find that analysts with more access to managers 
are strategically less optimistic in forecasting earnings and more optimistic in stock 
recommendations. Thus, analysts may ignore the inflation in EPS due to the expected 
number of shares to be repurchased so that firms can meet or beat analysts’ forecasts easily 
with the help of repurchases. On the other hand, a close relationship with managers helps 
analysts have a better understanding of firms’ operations. Such close relationships help 
analysts generate EPS forecasts, especially for events with uncertainty, such as repurchase 
announcements. For instance, Brown et al. (2015) survey sell-side analysts and report that 
private communication with management is a useful input for analysts’ forecasts. Since a 
closer relationship with managers increases the opportunity to have a private 
communication with managers, which may give analysts a better idea of firms’ repurchase 
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plans, analysts may be more likely to estimate the number of shares to be repurchased when 
they revise EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements. Because the above two 
perspectives provide opposing predictions, I do not make a directional prediction for the 
impact of analyst-manager relationships on analysts’ revised number of shares outstanding 
after repurchase announcements.  
H2a: The analyst-manager relationship does not impact analysts’ revisions of shares 
outstanding when they revise EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements. 
 
Second, I investigate the impact of repurchase announcement uncertainties on 
analysts’ revisions of shares outstanding. The information processing cost is higher for 
firms with higher uncertainty, which may disincentivize analysts to revise their forecasts 
(Griffin et al. 2018). However, when there is a higher uncertainty, there is a higher demand 
from the market for forecasts from professionals (Loh and Stulz 2018). Thus, analysts may 
be more willing to revise shares outstanding to meet the demand. Again, I do not make a 
directional prediction for the impact of repurchase announcement uncertainties on analysts’ 
revised number of shares outstanding after repurchase announcements.  
H2b: The repurchase announcement uncertainty does not impact analysts’ revisions of 
shares outstanding when they revise EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements. 
 
In my third hypothesis, I explore whether the numerator-driven EPS forecast 
revisions, which remove the mechanical increase in EPS forecasts due to expected number 
of shares to be repurchased, are more indicative of future operating performance than the 
actual EPS forecast revisions reported by analysts. Shares to be repurchased reduce the 
estimated number of shares outstanding, which is the denominator of EPS forecasts, and 
thus mechanically increase the EPS forecasts. However, the EPS increase induced by 
shares repurchased is because of a smaller denominator, not because of enhanced firm 
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fundamentals. In other words, the mechanical increase in EPS induced by shares 
repurchased should not reflect a firm’s future operating performance. Therefore, my third 
hypothesis, which compares the predictive power of actual EPS forecast revisions (EPS 
forecast revisions as reported by analysts) and numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions 
(EPS forecast revisions that remove the mechanical impact of estimated shares repurchased 
from the actual EPS forecast revisions) in predicting firms’ future operating performances, 
is stated as follows: 
H3: The numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions have a higher predictive power for 
future operating performance than the actual EPS forecast revisions.  
 
Lastly, I examine if market participants impound the denominator-driven EPS 
changes into their investment decisions. If the denominator-driven EPS forecasts, or the 
EPS forecast distortion, reduce the ability of EPS forecasts in predicting future operating 
performance, then market participants should discount such distortion. In other words, if 
the market fails to realize and incorporate the distortion, mispricing may occur. Prior 
literature has mixed findings whether the market discounts the denominator-driven EPS 
changes, in general. For example, Hribar et al. (2006) finds that market participants 
discount the repurchase-induced EPS changes at earnings announcements, while 
Cedergren and Marshall (2019) document a market failure to interpret the denominator-
driven EPS changes at earnings announcements. In my study’s repurchase announcement 
setting, it is difficult for the market to predict whether announcing firms will repurchase 
and how many shares and how much money they will repurchase. Therefore, this study 
predicts that the market fails to process the implications of the denominator-driven EPS 
 
17 
 
 
forecast changes, or EPS forecast distortions, because of the expected shares to be 
repurchased during the forecast period.  
H4: Market participants fail to incorporate the EPS forecast distortion due to repurchase 
forecasts when analysts release their EPS forecasts revisions after repurchase 
announcements.  
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CHAPTER 3. SAMPLE AND VARIABLE DEFINITION 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I use the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC) for repurchase announcement 
data, CRSP for stock market data, Compustat for accounting data, and I/B/E/S Details for 
earnings forecast data. I use I/B/E/S Details database for individual analyst forecasts, 
instead of I/B/E/S Summary for consensus forecasts, because using the individual analyst 
forecasts solves the stale forecasts problem embedded in consensus forecasts (Brown 1993) 
and the missing information problem when bold forecasts are dropped (Clement and Tse 
2005).6  
The main sample used in this paper includes all the OMR announcement events 
from 2005 to 2018. The sample period starts in 2005 because repurchase data became 
available in 2004 and I need lagged repurchases in the repurchase estimation. The sample 
period ends in 2018, which is the latest year with complete data. I estimate my analyses at 
the analyst-OMR announcement level. To mitigate the problems of stale analyst forecasts 
and confounding factors, the sample only includes forecasts made within 90 days before 
and within 30 days after repurchase announcements to calculate analyst revisions. In 
addition, for firms to have time to make repurchases after repurchase announcement, I drop 
repurchases announced within 30 days before the forecast period ends. Finally, after 
deleting the observations with missing control variables, the final sample contains 4,784 
 
6 Brown (1993) points out that consensus forecasts may contain stale forecasts in the I/B/E/S Summary files 
and using I/B/E/S Detail files can void this problem. Gleason and Lee (2003) and Clement and Tse (2005) 
find that forecasts that diverge from the consensus and bold forecasts are more priced by the market and 
contain useful private information. Also, I/B/E/S consensus forecasts may not be appropriate to use. Kaplan 
et al. (2018) find that I/B/E/S may opportunistically remove certain analyst forecasts from consensus, not 
simply based on outliers, to facilitate managers’ needs, which indicates that consensus forecasts may lose 
information regarding the analyst revision behaviors. 
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analyst-firm-quarter observations during 2005-2018 and covers 920 OMR announcements. 
Table 1 panel A shows the detailed construction process for the repurchase announcement 
sample.  
3.2 Variable Measurement 
For each OMR announcement in the repurchase announcement sample, I collect 
the last quarterly EPS forecast made within 90 days before the OMR announcement date 
(EPS_PreRepAnn) from all individual analysts. I then find the first EPS forecast after the 
OMR announcement (EPS_PostRepAnn) from the same analysts to calculate EPS forecast 
revisions for each individual analyst (ForecastREVt). I require only the availability of 
EPS_PreRepAnn. If EPS_PostRepAnn is missing, I treat it as equal to EPS_PreRepAnn, 
i.e., no revision. Figure 1 illustrates a timeline of these two EPS forecasts relative to the 
OMR announcement date. To mitigate the confounding effect of other significant events, 
I require the first forecasts after the OMR announcement (EPS_PostRepAnn) to be reported 
within 30 days after the announcement. I also delete the observations with earnings 
announcements made between the two forecasts.  
I only discuss key variables below. Definitions for all other variables are detailed 
in Appendix A. 
Analyst EPS Forecast Revision (ForecastREVt) 
My first dependent variable is an analyst’s EPS forecast revision after an OMR 
announcement (ForecastREVt). ForecastREVt equals the difference between the first EPS 
estimate made after the repurchase announcement and the last EPS estimate made before 
the repurchase announcement, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal 
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quarter, i.e., ForecastREVt = [(EPS_PostRepAnnt – EPS_PreRepAnnt) / Pricet–1] × 1,000, 
where EPS_PostRepAnnt and EPS_PreRepAnnt are defined earlier and Pricet–1 is stock 
price at the end of quarter t–1. A one cent change in EPS is considered significant, given 
the consistent findings in the previous literature that market participants penalize firms for 
even missing the EPS target by one cent (e.g., Hribar et al. 2006). Therefore, the magnitude 
of price scaled EPS forecast revisions is very small mathematically, so I multiply the 
measure by 1,000.  
Estimated Repurchase-Completion Ratio (Completion Ratiot)  
I estimate a repurchase-completion ratio for an OMR announcement using the 
firm’s completion condition for the previous OMR announcement. I obtain the beginning 
and ending dates for all repurchases associated with the previous OMR announcement from 
SDC. I divide the number of shares repurchased in the first repurchase by the repurchase 
interval (= ending date – beginning date + 1) and calculate the shares repurchased per day 
for the first repurchase, assuming repurchases occur evenly in the repurchase interval. I do 
the same calculation for the second, third, and all remaining repurchases associated with 
the previous OMR. I then calculate the cumulative number of shares repurchased from Day 
0 (the repurchase announcement date of the previous OMR announcement) to Day d (d = 
1, 2, 3, …) after the announcement using the shares repurchased per day for each 
repurchase discussed earlier, and divide the cumulative number of shares repurchased by 
the announced number of shares to be repurchased in the previous OMR announcement. 
The above calculation yields a repurchase-completion ratio for the previous OMR 
announcement, which indicates the percentage of the announced number of shares that are 
already repurchased by Day d after the announcement date. If a firm is a first-time 
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repurchaser and has no prior completion history, I use the industry average completion 
ratio in the year before the repurchase announcement year as its completion ratio. If a firm’s 
previous repurchase announcement is made over five years before the current 
announcement, I treat the firm as a first-time repurchaser. Table 1, Panel B, reports the 
average repurchase-completion ratio for selected number of days after the repurchase 
announcement date. During the process of constructing the completion ratio variable, I 
drop the repurchase announcements with reported cumulative completion larger than the 
announced shares, which I treat as data errors.  
Expected Number of Shares to be Repurchased (ExpRepSharet) 
ExpRepSharet is an analyst’s expected number of shares to be repurchased between 
the repurchase announcement date of the current OMR announcement and the fiscal 
quarter-end date (from the repurchase announcement date to the forecast period-end date, 
as illustrated in Figure 1). ExpRepSharet = Announced Sharest × Completion Ratiot, where 
Announced Sharest is the announced number of shares to be repurchased in the current 
OMR announcement, Completion Ratiot is the repurchase-completion ratio at Day N from 
the previous OMR announcement, and Day N = forecast period-end date – repurchase 
announcement date of the current OMR announcement + 1. 
Net Income Revisions (NIREVt) 
NIREVt is the revision of net income (the numerator of EPS forecasts), which is the 
difference between the first net income forecast after the repurchase announcement date 
and the last net income forecast before the announcement date, scaled by the market value 
of common equity at the beginning of the quarter. NIREVt = {[EPS_PostRepAnnt × 
(ShareOutt–1 – ExpRepSharet) – EPS_PreRepAnnt × ShareOutt–1] / MVt–1} × 1,000,000, 
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where ShareOutt–1 (MVt–1) is the number of common shares outstanding (market value of 
common equity) at the beginning-of-quarter. For the analyst-firm quarters when analysts 
provide diluted EPS forecasts, an estimated dilution effect is added to ShareOutt-1. 
Estimated dilution effect is calculated as the difference between the shares used in the 
diluted EPS calculation and the shares used in the basic EPS calculations in quarter t-1. 
Because the magnitude of net income revision is very small, I multiply the measure by 
1,000,000. (ShareOutt–1 – ExpRepSharet) represents the number of shares outstanding that 
analysts would have used in their EPS forecasts if their estimated number of shares to be 
repurchased is ExpRepSharet. EPS_PostRepAnnt × (ShareOutt–1 – ExpRepSharet) is an 
analyst’s first net income forecast after the OMR announcement, assuming they considered 
expected repurchases. Before the OMR repurchase announcement date, since no 
repurchases would have been expected, the most recent quarter’s common shares 
outstanding would be the share number available to and used by analysts. EPS_PreRepAnnt 
× ShareOutt–1 represents an analyst’s last net income forecast before the OMR 
announcement. 
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Table 1  Sample 
Panel A. Repurchase Announcement Sample 
Construction   
Repurchase 
Announcements    
No. of 
Observations 
Repurchase announcement Firm-Quarters from 2005-
2018 
 11,898   
Minus: Failed matching with IBES or Compustat  (5,755)   
Minus: Firm-Quarters without analyst forecasts within 90 
days before repurchase announcement or missing IBES 
data 
 (2,999)   
Minus: Firm-Quarters with fiscal quarter ends within one 
month after repurchase announcement 
 (760)   
Repurchase announcements used in the sample  2,384   22,169  
Minus: Missing variables used to calculate EPS revision, 
net income revision or expected shares repurchased 
 (1,337)  (16,024) 
Minus: Missing control variables  (127)  (1,361) 
Final Sample  920  4,784 
          
 
Panel B. Repurchase Completion Speed   
Number of Days after 
Repurchase Announcement 
Cumulative Repurchases As a % 
of Announced Repurchase Shares 
Cumulative Repurchases As a % of 
Outstanding Shares 
0 2.54% 0.29% 
10 4.90% 0.41% 
20 7.86% 0.60% 
30 10.35% 0.78% 
40 12.41% 0.90% 
50 14.05% 1.02% 
60 15.33% 1.11% 
70 15.74% 1.16% 
80 16.81% 1.23% 
90 17.69% 1.30% 
100 18.35% 1.37% 
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Figure 1  EPS Revision Timeline – Around Repurchase Announcement 
 
Figure 1 shows the timeline this study uses to define analysts’ EPS forecast revisions around the repurchase announcement dates and to estimate the shares 
to be repurchased for the forecast period. It takes the last EPS forecast before the repurchase announcements (EPS_PreRepAnn) and the first EPS forecast 
after the repurchase announcements (EPS_PostRepAnn) to calculate the EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV). To keep only the analysts that are actively 
following the repurchase firm, I require the last EPS forecasts before the repurchase announcement to be within 90 days; to mitigate the influence of the 
confounding events on analysts’ EPS forecast revisions, I require the first EPS forecast after the repurchase announcement to be with 30 days after the 
announcement, and I also drop the observations with EPS announcements during the revision period; and finally, I keep only the firms with a forecast 
period end date more than 30 days from the repurchase announcement date so that firms have sufficient time to conduct repurchases.   
EPS_PreRepAnnt Repurchase  
Announcement 
EPS_PostRepAnnt 
Less than 90 days Less than 30 days 
EPSt–1 
Announcement 
Forecast Periodt 
End Date 
EPSt 
Announcement 
Pricet–1 
MVt–1 
ForecastREVt = (EPS_PostRepAnnt – EPS_PreRepAnnt) / Pricet–1 
ExpRepSharet = Announced Sharest × Completion Ratiot 
NIREVt = [EPS_PostRepAnnt × (ShareOutt–1 – ExpRepSharet) – EPS_PreRepAnnt × ShareOutt–1] / MVt–1 
ExpRepSharet UnExpRepSharet 
More than 30 days 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the repurchase announcement sample. 
ForecastREV is EPS revision after a repurchase announcement. Its mean value of -0.014 
is significantly negative (p = 0.050), while its median value of 0.000 is insignificant. The 
numerator-driven EPS forecast revision (NDForecastREV) has significantly negative mean 
(-0.233, p = 0.000) and median value (-0.075, p = 0.000). As mentioned in section 2.2, 
there are mixed findings about the directions of analysts’ EPS forecast revisions in the 
previous literature. This study first provides additional evidence that analysts revise their 
EPS forecast downward after repurchase announcements on average, but the median 
revisions are zero. Moreover, the summary statistics show some preliminary evidence that 
numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions (NDForecastREV) are more negative in both 
magnitude and significance level than actual EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV). This 
result offers a possibility of using the NDForecastREV to synthesize the previous mixed 
findings about the analyst EPS forecast directions.  
ExpRepShare is analysts’ estimates of shares to be repurchased based on a firm’s 
previous repurchase-completion ratio or its previous industry average repurchase-
completion ratio for first repurchasers. UnExpRepShare is the unexpected number of shares 
repurchased, and its mean value is significantly positive, indicating that analysts on average 
underestimate the shares to be repurchased by firms. NIREV is analysts’ revision of net 
income, the numerator of EPS forecasts after a repurchase announcement, and its mean 
value is significantly negative. Overall, the above results suggest that, on average, analysts 
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revise EPS and net income downward after repurchase announcements, and they tend to 
underestimate the number of shares to be repurchased. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
4.2 Analyst EPS Forecast Revisions after OMR Announcements 
This section examines whether analysts revise their forecasts of shares outstanding 
(the denominator of EPS forecasts) downward according to their expected number of 
shares to be repurchased when they revise their EPS forecasts after an OMR 
announcement. Analysts’ expected number of shares to be repurchased after repurchase 
announcements (ExpRepShare) is not directly observable. To test whether analysts 
incorporate ExpRepShare in their EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements, I follow 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) and O'Brien (2014) and use EPS revisions after repurchase 
announcements (ForecastREV) as the dependent variable in Equation (1) below.  
ForecastREVt = a0 + a1ExpRepSharet + a2NIREVt + a3CashAssett-1 + a4DebtRatiot-1  
  + a5DivPayert-1 + a6LogATt-1 + a7RETEt-1 + a8ROCAAt-1 + a9CapExpt-1  
  + a10LogMVt-1 + a11BTMt-1 + a12ROAt-1 + a13Followt-1 + a14FpedatsGapt-1 
  + a15DaysFFt-1 + a16DaysLFt-1 + a17numFOREt-1 + a18Experiencet-1  
  + a19BrokerSizet-1 + a20GDPGt-1 + a21tb3mst-1 + i.FF48IND + i.Year  
  + i.Qtr + ε,         (1) 
 
ForecastREV is the EPS forecast revisions for the quarter t after the OMR 
announcement. ExpRepShare is the expected number of shares to be repurchased from the 
OMR announcement date to the fiscal quarter-end date. NIREV is the revision of net 
income, the numerator of EPS forecasts. The control variables include firm, analyst, and 
macro level variables, mostly following O'Brien (2014) and Berger et al. (2018). All the 
control variables are in the quarter t-1 before the repurchase announcement date. Appendix 
A contains the detailed definitions of all variables. 
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The variable of primary interest is ExpRepShare. If analysts incorporate 
ExpRepShare in their EPS forecasts after the OMR announcement, their EPS forecasts are 
mechanically increased due to the decrease in the number of shares outstanding. This 
induces a positive relation between ForecastREV and ExpRepShare. Because I control for 
NIREV (the numerator of EFS forecasts) in Equation (1), the coefficient on ExpRepShare 
captures only the downward revision of shares outstanding (the denominator of EPS 
revisions), not the revision of net income (the numerator of EPS revisions). In other words, 
all the potential net income related information signaled by the repurchase activities are 
controlled. A positive coefficient on ExpRepShare (a1 > 0) is consistent with H1, 
suggesting that analysts revise the number of shares outstanding downward after the OMR 
announcement based on their expected number of shares to be repurchased (ExpRepShare).  
Table 3 shows the main results. The significantly positive coefficient on 
ExpRepShare in Model 1 and Model 2 indicates that analysts revise the denominator of 
EPS forecasts (the number of shares outstanding) downward based on the expected number 
of shares to be repurchased (ExpRepShare) after OMR announcements, consistent with H1. 
The coefficient on NIREV is also significantly positive in Model 1 and Model 2, suggesting 
that analysts also revise the numerator, net income, of EPS forecasts after the OMR 
announcement. To compare the influence magnitude between ExpRepShare and NIREV, 
with different scales, I standardize the dependent and all the independent variables in 
Model 2 Std, and the results show that NIREV has a higher influence on ForecastREV than 
ExpRepShare, and this difference is significant at the 1% significance level (untabulated). 
I further examine analysts’ share adjustments under different conditions. First, in 
model 3, I consider the possibility that analysts may regularly update their forecasts of 
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repurchases, with or without repurchase announcements. I split the ExpRepShare into the 
portion with routine repurchase forecasts (ExpRepModel) and the rest updated with only 
the new information in repurchase announcements (ExpRep-ExpRepModel). I use the two-
stage repurchase estimation model provided by Hribar et al. (2006) to estimate 
ExpRepModel. I find that the potential routine repurchase forecast (ExpRepModel) is 
marginally related to ForecastREV, while the remaining portion (ExpRep-ExpRepModel) 
is still highly significant in predicting ForecastREV, and the difference between the two 
portions in predicting ForecastREV is statistically significant (untabulated).  
Second, if analysts revise their EPS forecast based on estimated repurchases, then 
the unexpected repurchase portion (UnExpRepShare) should not be related to their EPS 
forecast revision. I examine this counterfactual in Model 4. While ExpRepShare and 
NIREV are still positively significant, the UnExpRepShare is insignificant, suggesting that 
analysts can only include the expected portion of repurchases in their forecasts, not the 
unexpected portion.  
Third, I test if the magnitude of expected repurchases influences analysts’ use of 
the expected share changes in their EPS forecasts. Model 6 shows that expected repurchase 
shares’ impact on EPS amount increases the likelihood analysts impound repurchases in 
their forecasts. However, I do not find a significant moderating effect of the large 
repurchases, defined as the top quintile expected repurchase shares as a percent of 
outstanding shares, on forecast revisions, although the positive coefficient of the interaction 
is in the expected direction.  
Finally, I test the influence of mandatory repurchase disclosure rule on analysts’ 
EPS forecasts. Before 2004, firms are not required to report their actual repurchases or to 
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follow their announced repurchase plans. In other words, they can announce open market 
repurchases to send positive signals without pursuing their announced plans, and what is 
worse, the market would have no idea how many shares firms actually repurchased. 
Starting from 2004, the SEC proposed a Rule 10b-18 amendments, requiring firms to 
disclose detailed repurchase information, including the shares repurchased and repurchase 
price in each month, in their 10Q/10K reports. This rule greatly increased the transparency 
of firms’ repurchases. In model 7, I find that as expected, analysts are more likely to 
estimate repurchases and impound the share change effects in their EPS forecasts.  
Overall, the results from Table 3 supports my first hypothesis that analysts impound 
the estimates of changes in outstanding shares, based on the estimated shares to be 
repurchased, into their EPS forecasts and thus EPS forecast revisions after repurchase 
announcements. 
4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Analyst’s Revisions of Shares Outstanding 
 In this section, I use equation (1) in subsamples with high or low moderating 
variables to investigate the factors affecting analysts’ revisions of shares outstanding when 
they revise their EPS forecasts after repurchase announcements. I focus on whether analyst-
manager relationships and repurchase announcement uncertainties moderate analysts’ 
revisions of the shares component of EPS forecasts.  
lnDaysFollow is the log of the number of days in which an analyst follows a firm, 
which proxies the relationships between analysts and managers. Before the logged form, 
the average (median) time analysts follow a firm is approximately five (three) years. 
CommonUncert is the uncertainty of the OMR announcements that is the same to all 
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analysts, and OverallUncert includes the common uncertainty and the uncertainty related 
to analysts’ private information. The difference between OverallUncert and 
CommonUncert is the idiosyncratic uncertainty that is associated with analysts’ private 
information (AnalystUncert). Both uncertainty measures follow the spirits of Barron et al. 
(1998) and Lehavy et al. (2011). Specifically, OverallUncert equals (1 – 1/NumAnalyst) × 
Dispersion + Accuracy, and CommonUncert equals (Accuracy – Dispersion/NumAnalyst). 
NumAnalyst is the number of analysts providing forecasts after the OMR announcements, 
Dispersion is the standard deviation of the EPS forecasts after the OMR announcements, 
and Accuracy is the difference between the actual EPS for the forecast quarter and 
EPS_PostRepAnn. I create ranked variables of lnDaysFollow, CommonUncert and 
AnalystUncert to deciles, while the top decile subsample includes the firms with the highest 
and the bottom decile subsample has firms with the lowest number of days followed and 
uncertainty levels. I then examine equation (1) in the top and bottom decile subsamples 
separately.  
Table 4 shows that ExpRepShare is significantly positive in both the high and low 
lnDaysFollow subsamples, while the untabulated results show that the coefficient of 
ExpRepShare is significantly more positive in the subsample with high lnDaysFollow (p = 
0.000). ExpRepShare is significantly positive in the subsamples with low CommonUncert 
or high AnalystUncert, but insignificant in the subsamples with high CommonUncert or 
low AnalystUncert. These results indicate that lnDaysFollow influences analysts’ share 
adjustment behaviors, with regard to the extent to which analysts adjust shares in EPS 
forecasts but not whether analysts adjust shares. Further studies are needed to figure out 
why the days analysts following a firm influence the adjustment extent. Uncertainties 
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around repurchase announcements that are common to all analysts and that are specific to 
individual analysts both influence analysts’ share adjustment behaviors but in different 
directions. Analysts only adjust shares when there are low common uncertainties but high 
analyst-specific uncertainties. The possible explanations are that when there are high 
uncertainties that are specific to individual analysts, different individuals have different 
interpretations of the repurchase announcement events, so investors may have high demand 
of different analysts’ interpretations which drives analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand, 
when there are high uncertainties that are common to analysts, the uncertainties may be at 
the broad level which generates high costs for analysts to provide forecasts. At the same 
time, the demand for individual analysts’ interpretations is not as high, given the common 
uncertainties are the same for everyone and thus different interpretations may not be as 
informative. 
 Overall, these results are consistent with the arguments that length of time an 
analyst following a firm and uncertainties all influence analysts’ share forecast behaviors. 
Specifically, analysts who follow firms for a longer period adjust shares, based on expected 
repurchases, to a greater extent when they revise their EPS forecasts after repurchase 
announcements. Analysts adjust their estimations of outstanding shares, based on expected 
repurchases, only when the uncertainties around repurchase announcements that are 
common to analysts are low and when the uncertainties that are specific analysts are high.  
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4.4 Actual versus Numerator-driven EPS Forecast Revisions in Predicting Future 
Operating Performance 
 In this section, I use equation (2) to examine whether the numerator-driven EPS 
forecast revisions or the actual EPS forecast revisions have a higher predictive power for 
future operating performance.  
FutureROA = c0 + c1ForecastREV (NDForecastREV) + c2CashAsset + c3DebtRatio  
  + c4DivPayer + c5LogAT + c6RETE + c7ROCAA + c8CapExp + c9LogMV 
  + c10BTM + c11Follow + c12FpedatsGap + c13DaysFF + c14DaysLF  
  + c15numFORE + c16Experience + c17BrokerSize + c18GDPG + c19tb3ms  
  + c20ROA + i.FF48IND + i.Year + i.Qtr + ε,   (2) 
 
FutureROA is the future ROA (earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total 
assets) in the one to four quarters after the repurchase announcements, controlling the ROA 
in the quarter before the repurchase announcements. I compare the EPS revisions as 
actually reported by analysts (ForecastREV), which is the forecast revision measure I have 
been using the previous sections, with the numerator-driven EPS revisions that remove the 
mechanical impact of expected number of shares to be repurchased on EPS forecasts 
(NDForecastREV) to find out which one has higher predictive power of future ROA. As 
we recall, ForecastREV (= [(EPS_PostRepAnnt – EPS_PreRepAnnt) / Pricet–1] × 1,000). 
The calculation of NDForecastREV uses the numerator-driven EPS forecasts after 
repurchase announcements (NDEPS_PostRepAnn), which removes the repurchase-
induced component from the post repurchase announcement EPS forecasts 
(EPS_PostRepAnn). That is, I utilize the same shares outstanding, the most recent quarter’s 
shares outstanding, for both the EPS_PreRepAnn and the NDEPS_PostRepAnn 
calculations, so no repurchases’ impacts are included in the NDEPS_PostRepAnn. The 
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difference between the two revisions is defined as the EPS forecast distortions 
(Distortion).7  
Table 5 presents the results. ForecastREV is not significant in any of the four future 
ROA prediction horizons. ForecastREV, thus, does not predict future ROA. In contrast, 
NDForecastREV predicts future ROA for at least four quarters after the repurchase 
announcements, consistent with H3 that removing the mechanical impact of repurchased 
shares on EPS forecasts can make the numerator-driven EPS revisions better reflect a 
firm’s future performance.  
These results support my third hypothesis that comparing with the EPS forecast 
revisions as reported by analysts, the numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions that remove 
the mechanical impact of share changes on EPS better predict firms’ future operating 
performances.  
4.5 Market Mispricing to EPS Forecast Distortion  
 This section tests the last hypothesis whether market participants succeed or fail to 
process the implications of share changes from expected repurchases in using analysts’ 
EPS forecast revisions.   
 First, I calculate the EPS forecast distortion (Distortion) as the difference between 
the analysts’ released actual EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV) and the numerator-
 
7 The detailed calculation of the NDEPS_PostRepAnnt is as follows: I first use EPS_PostRepAnnt and 
ExpRepSharet to back out the net income forecast, which is EPS_PostRepAnnt × (ShareOutt-1 – 
ExpRepSharet), and then I calculate the NDEPS_PostRepAnnt as if no repurchases were estimated, so it 
equals EPS_PostRepAnnt × (ShareOutt-1 – ExpRepSharet) / ShareOutt. The NDEPS_PostRepAnnt is 
EPS_PostRepAnnt – EPS_PostRepAnnt × ExpRepSharet/ShareOutt-1. Estimated dilution effects, which 
equals to the difference between the common shares used to calculate the diluted EPS and the common 
shares used to calculate the basic EPS in quarter t-1, is added to ShareOutt-1 if analysts provide diluted EPS 
forecasts. 
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driven EPS forecast revisions after removing the mechanical effects of share changes 
(NDForecastREV). Essentially, Distortion is the same as the denominator-driven forecast 
revisions and the mechanical effects of share changes on EPS forecast changes. I then form 
portfolios by ranking the observations into quintiles, based on the Distortion in table 6 
panel A and the absolute value of Distortion in panel B. In order to keep as many 
observations, I do not drop the observations missing control variables to be used in the 
return regression analysis. The abnormal buy-and-hold returns, in the one to four quarter 
after analysts release their first EPS forecast after repurchase announcements, are 
significantly higher in the top Distortion quintile than in the bottom quintile. The 
magnitude of the difference is economically significant, with 3.1% to 9.6% difference. To 
mitigate the concern that the firms in different Distortion quintiles already have different 
returns to begin with, I then calculate the difference between the future abnormal returns 
and the abnormal returns in the quarter before analysts release EPS forecasts. The results 
are robust. 
 Second, in panel C, I use OLS regression to examine the mispricing, controlling for 
firm and analyst characteristics, time and industry fixed effects, and previous returns. I find 
negative coefficient of Distortion in one to three quarter ahead abnormal returns, but not 
the four quarter ahead abnormal returns.  
 Overall, the results support my last hypothesis that market participants fail to 
impound the share change estimates due to expected repurchases in analysts’ EPS forecast 
revisions, making significant portfolio abnormal return differences. In other words, this 
section finds a significantly negative stock price drift for firms with extreme EPS 
Distortion, a pricing anomaly.  
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Table 2  Summary Statistics 
 Variables N Mean Std Min Median Max 
ForecastREV 4,784 -0.014 0.496 -2.993 0.000 2.138 
NDForecastREV 4,784 -0.233 0.746 -4.749 -0.075 2.049 
ExpRepShare 4,784 0.013 0.019 0.000 0.006 0.100 
UnExpRepShare 4,784 0.001 0.024 -0.094 0.003 0.059 
RepImpact 4,784 0.912 2.053 0.000 0.000 13.000 
NIREV 4,784 -0.415 1.513 -11.386 -0.082 2.580 
CashAsset 4,784 0.183 0.167 0.005 0.129 0.714 
DebtRatio 4,784 0.203 0.172 0.000 0.183 0.742 
DivPayer 4,784 0.560 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LogAT 4,784 8.640 1.669 4.951 8.593 12.118 
RETE 4,784 0.639 1.748 -10.384 0.731 5.898 
ROCAA 4,784 0.052 0.037 -0.013 0.046 0.214 
CapExp 4,784 0.022 0.028 0.000 0.014 0.157 
LogMV 4,784 15.531 1.685 11.530 15.617 19.358 
BTM 4,784 0.062 0.090 -0.014 0.037 0.644 
ROA 4,784 0.020 0.018 -0.035 0.018 0.101 
Follow 4,784 2.692 0.563 1.099 2.773 3.584 
numFollow 4,784 16.875 7.795 3 16 36 
FpedatsGap 4,784 3.831 0.226 3.401 3.829 4.263 
DaysFF 4,784 4.380 0.411 1.946 4.500 4.691 
DaysLF 4,784 3.808 0.988 0.693 4.407 4.654 
numFORE 4,784 0.278 0.400 0.000 0.000 1.386 
Experience 4,784 7.970 0.992 5.198 8.126 9.361 
BrokerSize 4,784 4.247 1.014 1.099 4.357 5.894 
GDPG 4,784 2.137 1.223 -3.900 2.400 3.900 
tb3ms 4,784 0.012 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.050 
This table provides the summary statistics for all the main variables used in the models. ForecastREV is the 
actual analyst EPS forecast revisions, and the NDForecastREV is the numerator-driven EPS forecast 
revisions, assuming no share adjustments are used in analysts’ EPS forecasts. ExpRepShare is analysts’ 
estimation of shares to be repurchased by firms between the repurchase announcement date and the forecast 
period end date. UnExpRepShare is the unexpected shares repurchased by firms, which is the difference 
between the actual repurchase shares and the expected repurchase shares. NIREV is analysts’ net income 
component revisions. ForecastREV and NDForecastREV are scaled by stock price, ExpRepShare and 
UnExpRepShare are scaled by outstanding shares, and NIREV is scaled by market value. Section 3 provides 
detailed calculations of these variables. See Appendix A for the definitions of all the variables. 
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Table 3 Analyst Revisions after Repurchase Announcements 
DV = ForecastREV 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Std Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.297 -0.038 0.749* -0.022 -0.024 -0.028 -0.061 -3.285**
(1.594) (-0.117) (1.723) (-0.068) (-0.072) (-0.085) (-0.198) (-2.217)
ExpRepShare 7.807*** 8.269*** 0.321*** 7.645*** 5.978*** 5.099*** 4.046***
(7.172) (7.253) (7.253) (6.015) (3.861) (3.031) (4.152)
NIREV 0.247*** 0.273*** 0.834*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.278*** 0.047***
(9.431) (10.125) (10.125) (10.113) (10.126) (10.207) (10.633) (4.453)
ExpRep - ExpRepModel 8.224*** 
(7.194) 
ExpRepModel 4.998* 
(1.944) 
UnExpRepShare -0.625
(-1.010)
ExpRepShare × LargeRep 4.089 
(1.475) 
ExpRepShare × RepImpact 0.667** 
(2.370) 
ExpRepShare × HighDis 0.101** 
(2.208) 
LargeRep -0.126
(-1.243)
RepImpact -0.010
(-0.798)
HighDis 0.301*** 
(2.928) 
NIREV × HighDis 0.028*** 
(3.195) 
CashAsset 0.014 0.005 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.037 0.051 
(0.138) (0.138) (0.146) (0.135) (0.151) (0.391) (0.278) 
DebtRatio 0.251** 0.087** 0.250** 0.257** 0.256** 0.273*** 0.278 
(2.480) (2.480) (2.484) (2.522) (2.538) (2.670) (1.611) 
DivPayer -0.011 -0.021 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009
(-0.349) (-0.349) (-0.207) (-0.324) (-0.334) (-0.428) (-0.167)
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  Table 3 Continued 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Std Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
lnAT -0.007 -0.024 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 -0.018
(-0.342) (-0.342) (-0.243) (-0.317) (-0.335) (-0.852) (-0.561)
RETE -0.008 -0.030 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(-1.395) (-1.395) (-1.269) (-1.375) (-1.326) (-1.220) (-1.240)
ROCAA 1.220** 0.092** 1.305** 1.269** 1.248** 1.060** 0.512
(2.131) (2.131) (2.295) (2.176) (2.169) (2.026) (0.768)
CapExp -0.690 -0.039 -0.685 -0.721 -0.731 -0.687 -1.318
(-1.520) (-1.520) (-1.489) (-1.561) (-1.605) (-1.567) (-1.160)
lnMV -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003
(-0.055) (-0.055) (-0.319) (-0.172) (-0.115) (0.175) (-0.093)
BTM 1.279*** 0.233*** 1.290*** 1.265*** 1.272*** 1.461*** 0.481**
(3.469) (3.469) (3.435) (3.425) (3.397) (3.797) (2.311)
ROA 1.738 0.064 1.665 1.695 1.787* 1.866** 2.846**
(1.606) (1.606) (1.552) (1.550) (1.691) (1.964) (2.241)
Follow 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.053
(0.189) (0.189) (0.278) (0.260) (0.238) (0.148) (1.391)
lnFpedatsGap 0.036 0.016 0.052 0.041 0.040 0.034 0.115
(0.656) (0.656) (0.931) (0.733) (0.728) (0.606) (1.553)
DaysFF 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.039
(1.105) (1.105) (1.096) (1.124) (1.304) (0.920) (1.506)
DaysLF 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012
(0.193) (0.193) (0.204) (0.155) (0.027) (0.225) (-1.444)
numFORE 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 -0.048
(0.643) (0.643) (0.623) (0.630) (0.637) (0.594) (-1.093)
lnExperience -0.005 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.015
(-1.064) (-1.064) (-1.100) (-1.072) (-1.094) (-1.090) (-1.493)
lnBrokerSize 0.010* 0.020* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.010* 0.000
(1.691) (1.691) (1.711) (1.709) (1.620) (1.684) (0.053)
GDPG 0.010 0.023 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.007
(0.678) (0.678) (0.655) (0.689) (0.579) (0.821) (0.600)
tb3ms 2.323 0.078 2.101 2.347 2.589 3.127 -0.458
(0.837) (0.837) (0.742) (0.842) (0.920) (1.162) (-0.386)
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Table 3 Continued 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Std Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND Year Qtr FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 4,784 4,784 4,784 4,784 4,784 4,784 4,784 5,815 
Adj. R2 0.448 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.504 0.226 
Table 3 shows the results of analysts’ share adjustment behaviors. Model 1 and Model 2 examine the main effect of estimated repurchase shares (ExpRepShare) on analysts’ 
EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV), with and without control variables, respectively. In order to compare the relative influence of ExpRepShare and NIREV, which have 
very different scales, Model 2 Std standardize all the dependent and independent variables to create comparable magnitudes. Model 3 to Model 7 further explore analysts’ 
share adjustment behaviors under different scenarios. Model 3 split the ExpRepShare into the portion that can be estimated based on firms’ regular repurchases 
(ExpRepModel) and the portions that are based on the incremental repurchase information from repurchase announcements (ExpRep-ExpRepModel). Model 4 includes the 
unexpected repurchase shares (UnExpRepShare). Model 5 investigates the moderating effect of large repurchase (LargeRep), which is the top quintile of repurchases as a 
percent of outstanding shares, on analysts’ share adjustments. Model 6 examines the moderating effect of the impact of estimated shares to be repurchased on EPS forecasts 
(RepImpact) on analysts’ share adjustments. Model 7 inspects the effect of mandatory repurchase disclosure (HighDis) on analysts’ share and net income adjustments. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The numbers in the 
parenthesis are t-statistics. t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
A. In model 2 Std, I standardize all the dependent and independent variables to compare the relative explanation power of ExpRepShare and NIREV on ForecastREV. The
coefficients on ExpRepShare and NIREV are 0.332 and 0.803, respectively, and they are significantly different, with p-value of 0.000. See Appendix A for variable
definitions.
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Table 4  Analyst-Manager Relationship and Uncertainty Cross-Sectional Tests 
DV = ForecastREV 
M1 lnDaysFollow M2 CommonUncert M3 AnalystUncert 
Bottom 
Decile 
Top 
Decile 
Bottom 
Decile 
Top 
Decile 
Bottom 
Decile 
Top 
Decile 
Intercept -0.147 3.580* 0.341 0.404 0.458* -0.561
(-0.510) (1.896) (1.114) (0.534) (1.893) (-0.607) 
ExpRepShare 0.258*** 0.399*** 0.500*** 0.191 0.071 0.668*** 
(5.096) (4.384) (5.366) (1.612) (1.478) (3.664) 
NIRev 0.755*** 1.024*** 1.054*** 0.580*** 0.319*** 1.232*** 
(6.601) (6.872) (12.737) (3.756) (4.571) (7.959) 
CashAsset -0.025 -0.149* 0.116 0.061 -0.091** 0.559**
(-0.563) (-1.652) (1.246) (0.792) (-1.960) (1.965) 
DebtRatio 0.057 0.012 0.239** 0.123* -0.011 0.166 
(1.596) (0.114) (2.467) (1.670) (-0.268) (1.055) 
DivPayer -0.142 -0.127 -0.295** 0.044 0.059 0.514* 
(-1.442) (-1.000) (-2.090) (0.357) (0.512) (1.903) 
lnAT -0.001 0.096 -0.411*** 0.019 -0.107 -0.121
(-0.008) (0.476) (-2.783) (0.056) (-1.005) (-0.608) 
RETE 0.008 -0.054 0.134 -0.219* -0.017 -0.177
(0.215) (-0.870) (1.099) (-1.741) (-0.502) (-0.892) 
ROCAA 0.124* 0.206* 0.024 0.305 0.011 -0.133
(1.939) (1.671) (0.185) (1.503) (0.251) (-0.852) 
CapExp -0.008 0.011 -0.125 0.006 0.051 0.072 
(-0.189) (0.181) (-1.492) (0.032) (1.022) (0.647) 
lnMV 0.036 -0.340 0.138 0.283 0.103 0.112 
(0.386) (-1.491) (1.346) (0.808) (1.094) (0.661) 
BTM 0.204** 0.239 0.496*** 0.208* 0.096* 0.293 
(2.310) (1.263) (4.820) (1.737) (1.935) (1.450) 
ROA -0.081 0.027 0.182** 0.019 0.010 0.237 
(-1.404) (0.274) (1.990) (0.124) (0.147) (1.430) 
Follow -0.011 0.146** 0.191** -0.072 0.005 -0.080
(-0.278) (2.021) (2.186) (-1.017) (0.099) (-0.478) 
lnFpedatsGap -0.012 -0.009 0.185** 0.032 0.102** 0.164 
(-0.345) (-0.173) (2.438) (0.365) (2.274) (1.309) 
DaysFF -0.034 0.037 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 
(-1.418) (1.250) (0.185) (-0.043) (-0.142) (0.440) 
DaysLF 0.070** -0.035 0.043 0.037 0.028 0.016 
(2.422) (-0.664) (1.198) (1.259) (1.125) (0.439) 
numFORE 0.052 0.022 0.055 -0.006 -0.001 0.029 
(1.229) (0.403) (1.401) (-0.138) (-0.033) (0.970) 
lnExperience -0.018 0.061 -0.027 -0.002 -0.013 -0.040
(-0.792) (0.419) (-0.753) (-0.092) (-0.636) (-0.928) 
lnBrokerSize 0.010 -0.040 0.021 0.031 0.011 0.016 
(0.386) (-1.133) (0.322) (1.066) (0.525) (0.206) 
GDPG 0.161** -0.038 0.091 0.039 -0.003 0.006 
(2.120) (-0.488) (0.650) (0.414) (-0.055) (0.024) 
tb3ms 0.067 0.546* -0.176 0.012 -0.371 -0.530
(0.316) (1.751) (-0.668) (0.027) (-1.354) (-0.811) 
IND Year Qtr FE YES YES YES 
Firm Cluster YES YES YES 
N 555 457 555 383 522 409 
Adj. R2 0.472 0.567 0.746 0.573 0.368 0.776 
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Table 4 explores the factors influencing analysts’ share adjustment behaviors. M1 examines analysts’ share 
adjustments separately in the subsamples with long (Top Decile) and short (Bottom Decile) periods 
analysts following a firm (lnDaysFollow). M2 and M3 examines analysts shares adjustments in the 
subsamples with high and low levels of uncertainties that are common to all analysts (CommonUncert) and 
that are specific to individual analysts (AnalystUncert), respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 
A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
The numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics. t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the
firm level.
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Table 5 Actual EPS Forecast Revisions vs. Numerator-driven EPS Forecast Revisions – Predicting Future Performance 
DV = ROAt DV = ROAt+1 DV = ROAt+2 DV = ROAt+3 
Intercept -0.049** -0.048** -0.033* -0.031* -0.043** -0.042** -0.039** -0.038**
(-2.505) (-2.505) (-1.742) (-1.714) (-2.338) (-2.339) (-2.274) (-2.271)
ForecastREV 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.051) (-0.650) (-0.354) (-0.249)
NDForecastREV 0.002** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 
(2.336) (1.912) (2.016) (2.035) 
CashAsset -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.006 -0.007 -0.010** -0.011**
(-2.751) (-2.872) (-1.960) (-2.067) (-1.249) (-1.356) (-2.109) (-2.216)
DebtRatio -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* -0.009** -0.009** -0.006 -0.006
(-1.752) (-1.733) (-1.955) (-1.950) (-2.213) (-2.213) (-1.526) (-1.512)
DivPayer 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.759) (0.708) (0.584) (0.547) (0.915) (0.878) (1.011) (0.972) 
lnAT -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-3.772) (-3.738) (-2.744) (-2.686) (-2.516) (-2.462) (-2.774) (-2.726) 
RETE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.323) (0.323) (0.577) (0.586) (0.547) (0.556) (0.736) (0.745) 
ROCAA 0.152*** 0.159*** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 
(3.284) (3.489) (2.708) (2.873) (3.333) (3.541) (4.297) (4.536) 
CapExp -0.023 -0.023 -0.039 -0.039 -0.069** -0.069** -0.092*** -0.092***
(-0.793) (-0.807) (-1.268) (-1.274) (-2.134) (-2.147) (-3.001) (-3.020) 
lnMV 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(3.754) (3.752) (2.883) (2.858) (2.933) (2.918) (3.113) (3.100) 
BTM 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.023* 0.022* 0.026** 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 
(2.892) (2.873) (1.927) (1.888) (2.163) (2.133) (2.178) (2.147) 
ROA 0.099 0.098 0.135 0.133 0.095 0.093 0.103 0.102 
(0.951) (0.952) (1.295) (1.291) (1.034) (1.028) (1.224) (1.224) 
Follow 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003** 
(2.602) (2.534) (2.246) (2.180) (1.969) (1.898) (2.199) (2.126) 
lnFpedatsGap -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.592) (-0.582) (-0.843) (-0.856) (0.006) (0.005) (-0.110) (-0.107)
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Table 5 Continued 
DV = ROAt DV = ROAt+1 DV = ROAt+2 DV = ROAt+3 
DaysFF -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.888) (-1.914) (-0.758) (-0.805) (-0.775) (-0.802) (-1.249) (-1.269)
DaysLF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.420) (0.381) (0.508) (0.489) (0.863) (0.843) (0.958) (0.936) 
numFORE 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.408) (0.412) (0.620) (0.611) (0.951) (0.951) (1.239) (1.241) 
lnExperience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.053) (0.166) (0.146) (0.264) (0.567) (0.677) (0.447) (0.559) 
lnBrokerSize 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.738) (0.681) (2.173) (2.135) (3.029) (3.007) (2.369) (2.340) 
GDPG 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
(1.901) (1.853) (2.168) (2.131) (2.116) (2.072) (2.095) (2.048) 
tb3ms 0.329 0.343 0.200 0.209 0.112 0.123 0.020 0.030 
(1.439) (1.496) (1.009) (1.053) (0.583) (0.636) (0.111) (0.168) 
IND Year Qtr FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm Cluster YES YES YES YES 
N 4,781 4,781 4,781 4,781 4,784 4,784 4,784 4,784 
Adj. R2 0.457 0.461 0.428 0.430 0.468 0.470 0.518 0.521 
Table 5 compares the actual analyst EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV) and the numerator-driven analyst EPS forecast revisions (NDForecastREV) in 
predicting firms’ future operating performance (ROA) for one to four quarters ahead, starting from the forecasting quarter t. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-
statistics. t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 6 Market Mispricing to EPS Distortion 
Panel A. Portfolios formed based on EPS distortion 
EPS Distortion (Distortion) Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Returns Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Returns Diff 
Quintile Obs. Mean [m1, m3] [m1, m6] [m1, m9] [m1, m12] [m1, m3] [m1, m6] [m1, m9] [m1, m12] 
0 336 -0.0591 0.0481 0.0390 0.0816 0.0935 0.0810 0.0708 0.1108 0.1275 
1 335 0.0305 0.0046 0.0719 0.0845 0.0876 0.0232 0.0909 0.1029 0.1105 
2 336 0.0805 0.0231 0.0609 0.0452 0.0681 0.0312 0.0697 0.0536 0.0760 
3 335 0.1861 0.0316 0.0424 0.0334 0.0483 0.0485 0.0615 0.0522 0.0678 
4 335 1.5600 0.0170 -0.0052 0.0106 -0.0029 0.0402 0.0170 0.0315 0.0240 
1677 
Hedge return (#0 - #4) 0.0310*** 0.0442*** 0.0710*** 0.0964*** 0.0408** 0.0537** 0.0793*** 0.1035*** 
t-statistics (2.620) (2.606) (3.124) (3.814) (2.202) (2.335) (2.883) (3.355) 
Panel B. Portfolios formed based on absolute EPS distortion 
EPS Distortion (Distortion) Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Returns Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Returns Diff 
Quintile Obs. Mean [m1, m3] [m1, m6] [m1, m9] [m1, m12] [m1, m3] [m1, m6] [m1, m9] [m1, m12] 
0 336 0.0037 0.0515 0.0446 0.0892 0.0881 0.0851 0.0771 0.1190 0.1231 
1 335 0.0322 0.0042 0.0757 0.0922 0.0958 0.0195 0.0921 0.1081 0.1153 
2 336 0.0829 0.0247 0.0623 0.0429 0.0764 0.0312 0.0695 0.0496 0.0825 
3 335 0.1898 0.0307 0.0356 0.0248 0.0410 0.0527 0.0597 0.0487 0.0656 
4 335 1.6136 0.0133 -0.0092 0.0061 -0.0067 0.0356 0.0116 0.0257 0.0193 
1677 
Hedge return (#0 - #4) 0.0383*** 0.0538*** 0.0832*** 0.0948*** 0.0495*** 0.0655*** 0.0933*** 0.1038*** 
t-statistics (3.299) (3.220) (3.738) (3.847) (2.691) (2.868) (3.443) (3.422) 
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Panel C. Return Regression (DV = Future Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Return) 
DV = Return[m1~m3] DV = Return[m1~m6] DV = Return[m1~m9] DV = Return[m1~m12] 
Intercept -0.000 (-0.002) 0.309 (0.782) 0.464 (1.105) 0.902* (1.741) 
Distortion -0.042* (-1.871) -0.113*** (-2.845) -0.106** (-2.268) -0.080 (-1.321) 
CashAsset 0.160* (1.882) 0.357*** (2.901) 0.450*** (3.097) 0.553*** (3.215) 
DebtRatio -0.003 (-0.044) -0.048 (-0.565) 0.007 (0.064) 0.113 (0.842) 
DivPayer 0.004 (0.165) 0.020 (0.579) 0.041 (1.011) 0.024 (0.481) 
lnAT 0.011 (0.563) 0.039 (1.292) 0.058* (1.908) 0.025 (0.596) 
RETE 0.010* (1.668) 0.017 (1.591) -0.002 (-0.195) -0.012 (-0.885) 
ROCAA -0.235 (-0.532) -0.491 (-0.747) -0.538 (-0.670) -0.376 (-0.410) 
CapExp -0.038 (-0.115) -0.706 (-1.330) -0.926 (-1.441) -1.484* (-1.959) 
lnMV 0.006 (0.274) -0.016 (-0.474) -0.045 (-1.320) -0.041 (-0.928) 
BTM -0.005 (-0.035) -0.282 (-1.151) -0.378 (-1.404) -0.070 (-0.183) 
ROA 1.048 (1.424) 2.107** (2.066) 1.648 (1.250) 0.994 (0.637) 
Follow -0.085*** (-3.076) -0.079** (-2.053) -0.086* (-1.874) -0.045 (-0.810) 
lnFpedatsGap 0.036 (0.919) -0.008 (-0.134) 0.062 (0.892) -0.016 (-0.227) 
DaysFF -0.021** (-2.059) -0.038** (-2.540) -0.044** (-2.374) -0.035* (-1.668) 
DaysLF 0.000 (0.062) -0.000 (-0.030) -0.002 (-0.166) 0.004 (0.421) 
numFORE 0.001 (0.075) 0.009 (0.485) -0.002 (-0.074) 0.003 (0.106) 
lnExperience -0.000 (-0.077) -0.010 (-1.441) -0.010 (-1.197) -0.010 (-0.969) 
lnBrokerSize 0.006 (1.341) 0.012** (2.407) 0.017*** (2.701) 0.022** (2.504) 
GDPG -0.031* (-1.914) -0.029* (-1.672) -0.009 (-0.384) 0.011 (0.330) 
tb3ms 2.186 (0.869) 2.195 (0.526) -1.507 (-0.276) -9.607 (-1.543) 
Return[m-3~m-1] -0.010 (-0.117) 0.010 (0.088) -0.050 (-0.374) 0.258* (1.726) 
IND Year Qtr FE and Firm Cluster YES YES YES YES 
N 749 749 749 749 
Adj. R2 0.291 0.281 0.290 0.308 
Table 6 investigates whether investors recognize and process the implications of the denominator-driven EPS forecast revisions (Distortion = the 
denominator-driven EPS forecast revisions). Panel A and Panel B form portfolios to five groups, based on the Distortion and the absolute value of 
Distortion, respectively. I then compare the future abnormal buy-and-hold return (three to twelve month ahead) and the future abnormal return after 
subtracting the previous abnormal returns between the top and bottom Distortion quintiles. Panel C uses OLS regression to further examine the impact of 
Distortion on abnormal returns after controlling for firm and analyst level characteristics and the previous returns. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics. t-
statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Analyst EPS Revisions After Repurchase Announcement – Alternative Model 
Additionally, I use alternative models to examine my main research question 
whether analysts adjust their forecasts of the share component of the EPS forecasts after 
repurchase announcements. In the first alternative model, I redefine the net income 
revision (NIREV) as the difference between the net income component forecasts before 
and after repurchase announcements using the same number of shares. Specifically, 
NIREV used in the model is calculated as EPS_PreRepAnnt × ShareOutt–1 subtracted by 
EPS_PostRepAnnt × ShareOutt–1, scaled by MVt-1, and times 1,000,000.  
The second alternative model learns from Hertzel and Jain (1991) when they 
examine whether Value Line mechanically adjust the forecast of shares outstanding. Net 
income forecast before (after) repurchase announcements equals the EPS forecasts before 
(after) announcements multiply the outstanding share forecasts before (after) 
announcements. Treating the net income forecast revisions as zero for mechanical share 
adjustment, the dependent variable in the alternative model is EPS forecast revisions as a 
percent of the last EPS forecasts before the repurchase announcements, and the 
independent variable is estimated repurchase shares as a percent of the difference 
between the common shares outstanding and the estimated repurchase shares.  
In these two alternative models, the untabulated results show that the coefficient 
of repurchase shares is significantly positive. After controlling for the unexpected 
portion, the estimated repurchase shares are still significantly positive, while the 
unexpected portions are insignificant.  
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5.2 Analysts’ Use of EPS Forecast Revisions in Price Forecasts and 
Recommendations 
In Section 4.4, I find that numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions are more 
indicative of future firm performance than actual EPS forecast revisions. One of the 
motivations analysts to provide accurate earnings forecast is to use it as an input in their 
stock recommendations (Brown et al. 2015). In this section, I explore which EPS revisions 
do analysts use in their own price target forecasts and stock recommendations. I re-estimate 
Equation (2) after changing the dependent variable to target price revision (PriceREV) or 
recommendation revisions (RecomREV). PriceREV is the difference between the first price 
forecast after the repurchase announcement and the last price forecast before the 
announcement, scaled by the beginning-of-quarter stock prices. RecomREV is the 
difference between the fist recommendation after repurchase announcement and the last 
recommendation before the announcement, and is reversely coded so that the larger number 
means higher recommendation. Because the value of RecomREV shows ranks, I use 
ordered logistic regression for this model. I use the OLS regression for the price forecast 
revision model.  
Table 7 shows the results. In the PriceREV model, the coefficients of ForecastREV 
and NDForecastREV are both positively significant, but ForecastREV is significantly 
larger than NDForecastREV (untabulated). Given that the numerator-driven forecast 
revision (NDForecastREV) better predicts a firm’s future performance than the actual 
forecast revision (ForecastREV) and NDForecastREV is on average smaller than 
ForecastREV, analysts may over-estimate the price target by relying more on 
ForecastREV. I empirically test the possibility of over-predicting stock price. The 
untabulated results show that the average price forecasts before repurchase announcements 
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are higher than the actual price for the forecasted period, but the average price forecasts 
after the repurchase announcements are higher than the actual price to a higher extent. The 
absolute price forecast errors after the repurchase announcements are significantly higher 
than the absolute forecast errors before the announcements (forecast error difference = 
0.217, p < 0.001). 
In the RecomREV model with only fixed effects controlled, the coefficient of 
ForecastREV is significantly positive while coefficient of NDForecastREV is insignificant. 
After controlling other firm and analyst characteristics in the model, either revision is 
insignificant, although the coefficient of ForecastREV is larger than NDForecastREV at 
glance. One reason of the lack of statistical significance in the model with all controls may 
be because of the small sample size in the recommendation test, which reduces the power 
of the test.  
These results indicate that analysts rely more on their released actual EPS forecast 
revisions rather than the numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions in estimating the target 
prices and in making buy and sell recommendations (with limited evidence). The results 
also show preliminary evidence of analysts over-estimating future stock price by relying 
on their actual EPS forecast revisions instead of the numerator-driven revisions.  
5.3 Actual EPS Forecast versus Numerator-Driven EPS Forecast in Predicting 
Stock Price and Making Stock Recommendation 
In Section 4.4, I examine whether reported or numerator-driven EPS forecast 
revisions are more indicative of future firm performance. In this section, I test which of the 
two better predicts firms’ actual EPS. I re-estimate Equation (2) after changing the 
dependent variable to perfect revisions (PrefectREV). PerfectREV is calculated as the 
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difference between the actual EPS in analysts’ forecast quarters and the last EPS forecasts 
before OMR announcements (EPS_PreRepAnn). EPS_PreRepAnn acts as an anchor, based 
on which analysts update their EPS forecasts after OMR announcements. If analysts made 
perfect EPS forecasts, then their updated EPS forecasts would be the same as the actual 
EPS. In other words, if they made perfect EPS revisions after OMR announcements, the 
revisions would be the difference between the actual EPS and their last forecasts before 
OMR announcements, which is PerfectREV. Therefore, the relationship between analysts’ 
EPS revisions and PerfectREV reflects how much analysts’ revised EPS forecasts become 
closer to the actual EPS. A higher relationship indicates a higher-quality EPS forecast 
update. Thus, the coefficient difference of actual ForecastREV and NDForecastREV shows 
which revisions better forecast the actual EPS.  
From Table 8, although both revisions predict actual EPS, ForecastREV has a 
stronger relationship with PerfectREV than NDForecastREV. Therefore, the EPS forecasts 
as reported by analysts provide a more accurate forecasts of actual EPS, comparing with 
the numerator-driven forecasts that remove the denominator-driven forecasts from analyst 
reported forecasts.  
5.4 Analyst EPS Forecast Revisions Based on Actual Repurchases 
Since there is a shortage of studies examining whether analysts adjust the share 
component when there is a change in outstanding shares in a timely manner, I use the actual 
repurchase implementation setting to further investigate this question when there is no 
estimation of repurchases needed. Specifically, I examine if analysts incorporate shares 
repurchased into their EPS forecasts after the actual number of shares repurchased is 
released and thus does not need to be estimated. Although firms are required to disclose 
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their repurchases in 10K/10Q filings, many firms disclose their shares repurchased in their 
earnings announcements (Huang et al. 2019). Therefore, this section examines whether 
analysts change their share estimates based on actually reported shares repurchased after 
the earnings announcements.  
As shown in Figure 2, to calculate forecast revisions after the earnings 
announcement dates (ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1), I compare the last EPS forecast made 
before the earnings announcements (EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1) with the first EPS forecast made 
after the earnings announcements (EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1). I use Equation (3) to examine 
whether analysts revise the number of shares outstanding downward after actual number 
of shares repurchased is released at earnings announcement date. I include all repurchase 
and non-repurchase firms in the sample. There are 529,599 observations in this earnings 
announcement sample 
ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1 = d0 + d1RepShare + d2NIREV_EarnAnnt+1 + d3CashAsset  
+ d4DebtRatio + d5DivPayer + d6LogAT + d7RETE + d8ROCAA
+ d9CapExp + d10LogMV + d11BTM + d12ROA + d13Follow + d14DaysFF
+ d15DaysLF + d16numFORE + d17Experience + d18BrokerSize
+ d19GDPG + d20tb3ms + i.FF48IND + i.Year + i.Qtr + ε,                  (3) 
ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1 is analysts’ revisions of the EPS forecast for the 
following quarter when the current quarter earnings is announced, scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. EPS_PreEarnAnn and EPS_PostEarnAnn are 
constructed similarly to the OMR announcement setting, except that they represent the 
forecasts for the following quarter and are measured around the earnings announcement 
date, when the actual repurchase shares are known to the public for most repurchase firms. 
RepShare is the actual number of shares repurchased in a quarter. Shares repurchased 
reduce the number of shares outstanding, and thus increase ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1. So, 
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a positive coefficient on RepShare is consistent with analysts incorporating actual shares 
repurchased in their EPS forecasts after earnings announcements and thus in their EPS 
forecast revisions (ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1).  
I further split the actual shares repurchased, RepShare, into the expected 
(ExpRepShareModel) and unexpected (UnExpRepShareModel) portions based a firm’s 
routine repurchase behaviors, and the estimation follows the two-stage repurchase 
estimation model derived in Hribar et al. (2006) on pages 18-19. From Figure 2, we can 
see that before the current quarter earnings announcement (EPSt Announcement), if 
analysts have made an estimation of repurchased shares, the expected shares 
(ExpRepShareModelt) would have been included in their last revision before the earnings 
announcement. It is the unexpected portion (UnExpRepShareModelt) that would change 
their estimations of the outstanding shares. Similarly, after EPSt Announcement, if analysts 
made expectations of the following quarter’s shares (ExpRepShareModelt+1), they would 
include ExpRepShareModelt+1 in the outstanding share estimates when they forecast the 
following quarter’s EPS (EPSt+1), but they cannot include the unexpected portion 
(UnExpRepShareModelt+1) that is not known until EPSt+1 is announced. In other words, if 
analysts estimate and impound the routine shares repurchased by firms when they adjust 
their EPS estimates, UnExpRepShareModelt and ExpRepShareModelt+1 would impact their 
EPS revisions, and this is what I find based on the results shown in Table 9. Model 1 shows 
that both RepShare and NIREV_EarnAnn have significantly positive coefficients, 
indicating that when analysts revise their EPS forecasts, they adjust both the numerator and 
denominator components. Model 2 shows that only the UnExpRepShareModelt and 
ExpRepShareModelt+1 significantly impact analysts’ EPS revisions. 
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As an alternative measure of expected repurchases for each period, I assume 
analysts simply use the actual repurchase shares from the most recent quarter as the 
estimated shares for each of the forecast quarters. Model 3 presents the results. Since 
analysts use the same estimated shares to be repurchased for each forecast quarter, 
ExpRepSharet and ExpRepSharet+1  are the same, so I only include the expected repurchase 
shares once in the RepShare variable. I still find that the UnExpRepShare is still significant, 
but not the UnExpRepSharet+1 which is not known until the earnings announcement date 
for quarter t+1. 
Overall, this section finds that analysts adjust the share component based on 
repurchases when they forecast EPS after they know the shares repurchased, and they also 
make expectations of the shares to be repurchased in their forecast quarters before they 
know the actual repurchases. These results provide more evidence to support the first 
hypothesis that analysts adjust their EPS forecasts based on the estimation of the share 
changes.  
5.5 Identification of Individual Analysts’ Share Adjustment Decisions 
In this section, I identify a subsample of analysts who do or do not adjust shares in 
their financial indicator forecasts, not limited to EPS forecasts. The method I use to identify 
the analysts is based on some groups of measures with both total and per share numbers 
available for each analyst-firm-quarter when they measure the same character of a firm, 
provided by IBES Details. I back out the number of shares used in an analyst’s forecast by 
dividing the total amount by the per share amount. The first group of measure is based on 
total EBITDA (EBT) divided by EBITDA per share (EBS), the second group is based on 
net asset value (NAV) and book value per share (BPS), and the third group is based on net 
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income (NET) and earnings per share (EPS). The number of shares calculated using three 
methods provided by the three groups of measure have a higher than 99% correlation, 
indicating that the number of shares so backed out is reliable. I then calculate the number 
of shares used by analysts in their forecasts using the average of the three calculated shares. 
I require at least one of the three calculated shares to be available to be included in the 
sample. 
I identify an analyst-firm-quarter with repurchase adjustment in the forecast as 
those whose first shares estimation after the OMR announcement (Share_PostRepAnn) is 
less than the last shares estimation before the OMR announcement (Share_PreRepAnn). 
Based on this identification, in the sample of 156 analyst-firm-quarters, 103 (66%) 
observations adjust shares in the financial indicator forecasts. I then compare the absolute 
forecast error of shares repurchased, which is the absolute value of (Share_PostRepAnn – 
Share_PreRepAnn – RepShare), between the two groups of analysts. The untabulated 
results show that the analyst-firm-quarters that adjust shares to be repurchased in their 
forecasts has a smaller shares repurchased forecast error than the group that does not adjust 
shares, with p-value of 0.052. In other words, analysts’ repurchase estimations used in their 
forecasts are indicative of a firm’s future actual repurchase implementation. 
In addition, there is a limitation in my paper that I use my estimation of shares to 
be repurchased based on the completion ratios of announced shares to proxy analysts’ 
estimations of shares. Using this small sample of the analyst-firm-quarters that incorporate 
estimated share changes in the EPS forecasts, I am able to back out the change in the 
number of shares used in the forecasts. I compare the share changes embedded in analysts’ 
forecasts with analysts’ expected number of shares to be repurchased using my estimation 
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method (ExpRepShare), and I find a 52% correlation between these two share measures, 
which provides some grounds that my estimate (ExpRepShare) is a reasonable proxy for 
the shares used in analysts’ EPS forecasts.  
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Table 7 Actual EPS Forecast Revisions vs. Numerator-driven EPS Forecast Revisions – Use in Analyst Forecasts 
DV = PriceREV DV = PriceREV DV = RecomREV DV = RecomREV 
Intercept 0.152 -1.206 0.198 -1.838
(0.443) (-1.045) (0.587) (-1.602)
ForecastREV 0.971*** 0.972*** 0.888* 0.870 
(7.069) (7.039) (1.784) (1.572) 
NDForecastREV 0.469*** 0.473*** 0.458 0.482 
(4.884) (4.797) (1.277) (1.127) 
CashAsset 0.288 0.166 -2.751 -2.718
(0.686) (0.383) (-0.785) (-0.774)
DebtRatio 0.197 0.338 -1.284 -0.979
(0.590) (0.945) (-0.641) (-0.465)
DivPayer 0.145 0.131 1.421** 1.262**
(0.871) (0.777) (2.203) (2.043)
lnAT -0.090 -0.048 -0.399 -0.272
(-1.004) (-0.516) (-0.994) (-0.573)
RETE 0.017 0.013 -0.140 -0.188
(0.559) (0.410) (-0.632) (-0.871)
ROCAA -3.408 -1.098 -9.723 -7.626
(-1.381) (-0.427) (-0.650) (-0.488)
CapExp 1.199 0.485 29.366* 28.579*
(0.581) (0.236) (1.747) (1.712)
lnMV 0.121 0.090 0.217 0.144
(1.354) (0.959) (0.536) (0.309)
BTM 0.372 0.164 0.475 -0.077
(0.547) (0.231) (0.131) (-0.019)
ROA 4.266 4.525 13.996 15.635
(1.053) (1.049) (0.600) (0.709)
Follow -0.107 -0.128 1.052 1.011
(-1.168) (-1.376) (1.073) (1.050)
lnFpedatsGap -0.275 -0.163 0.288 0.399
(-1.157) (-0.689) (0.186) (0.255)
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Table 7 Continued 
DV = PriceREV DV = PriceREV DV = RecomREV DV = RecomREV 
DaysFF 0.145 0.172* 0.933*** 1.010*** 
(1.611) (1.890) (2.757) (2.913) 
DaysLF 0.044 0.031 -0.141 -0.131
(0.972) (0.673) (-0.451) (-0.412)
numFORE 0.173 0.194* -1.121 -1.193
(1.539) (1.690) (-1.312) (-1.468)
lnExperience 0.029 0.030 -0.327* -0.355*
(0.862) (0.859) (-1.649) (-1.781)
lnBrokerSize 0.002 0.006 -0.088 -0.049
(0.037) (0.141) (-0.295) (-0.154)
GDPG -0.016 -0.021 -0.877** -0.857**
(-0.233) (-0.285) (-2.048) (-2.147)
tb3ms 10.986 18.181 -1.222 3.429
(0.750) (1.229) (-0.011) (0.031)
IND Year Qtr FE & Firm Cluster YES YES YES YES 
N 2,791 2,791 2,791 2,791 650 650 650 650 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.100 0.102 0.072 0.073 0.208 0.286 0.197 0.277 
Table 7 explores whether analysts use the actual analyst EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV) or the numerator-driven analyst EPS forecast revisions 
(NDForecastREV) in the revisions of setting their price target forecasts (DV = PriceREV) or in making stock buy-and-sell recommendations (DV = 
RecomREV). Since stock recommendations use ranked variables, I use ordered logistic regression in the RecomREV model. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-
statistics. t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 8 Actual EPS Forecast Revisions vs. Numerator-Driven EPS Forecast Revisions – 
Predicting EPS 
DV = PerfectREV DV = PerfectREV 
Intercept -0.015 (-0.005) -0.695 (-0.206) 
ForecastREV 1.207*** (6.240) 
NDForecastREV 0.706*** (4.367) 
CashAsset 1.569 (1.541) 1.358 (1.325) 
DebtRatio -1.226* (-1.666) -1.007 (-1.329) 
DivPayer -0.543 (-1.566) -0.590* (-1.711) 
lnAT 0.612** (2.400) 0.697*** (2.732) 
RETE -0.007 (-0.118) -0.019 (-0.311) 
ROCAA -0.691 (-0.068) 2.248 (0.215) 
CapExp -5.151 (-1.021) -6.084 (-1.184) 
lnMV -0.516** (-2.001) -0.574** (-2.208) 
BTM -1.508 (-0.676) -1.911 (-0.835) 
ROA 45.336** (2.015) 47.049** (2.069) 
Follow -0.012 (-0.051) -0.068 (-0.282) 
lnFpedatsGap 0.780 (1.571) 0.934* (1.881) 
DaysFF 0.107 (0.905) 0.148 (1.235) 
DaysLF -0.031 (-0.374) -0.052 (-0.590) 
numFORE -0.228 (-1.275) -0.209 (-1.144) 
lnExperience 0.004 (0.088) 0.001 (0.028) 
lnBrokerSize -0.026 (-0.623) -0.025 (-0.589) 
GDPG -0.028 (-0.147) -0.054 (-0.289) 
tb3ms -5.361 (-0.171) 4.262 (0.133) 
IND Year Qtr FE YES YES 
Firm Cluster YES YES 
N 4,784 4,784 
Adj. R2 0.176 0.167 
Table 8 compares the actual analyst EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV) and the numerator-driven 
analyst EPS forecast revisions (NDForecastREV) in predicting firms’ actual EPS for the forecasting 
quarter. To take into account of the analysts’ EPS forecast before the repurchase announcement, the 
dependent variable in this table is the revisions that are needed to achieve the actual EPS (PerfectREV), 
which is the difference between the actual EPS and analysts’ last EPS forecasts before repurchase 
announcements. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics. t-
statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
57 
Table 9 Analyst Revisions after Actual Shares Repurchased are Released 
DV = ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1 
Model 1 RepModel Model 2RepModel Model 3 PreRep 
Intercept 2.048*** (4.115) 1.980*** (3.929) 2.063*** (4.087) 
RepSharet 0.075*** (9.647) 
ExpRepShareModelt -0.004 (-0.165) 
UnExpRepShareModelt 0.066*** (5.795) 
ExpRepShareModelt+1 0.073*** (2.892) 
UnExpRepShareModelt+1 0.006 (0.581) 
UnExpRepSharePreRept 0.081*** (14.735) 
ExpRepSharePreRept+1 0.074*** (6.839) 
UnExpRepSharePreRept+1 0.005 (0.582) 
NIRev_EarnAnn 0.785*** (48.954) 0.785*** (48.891) 0.786*** (49.125) 
CashAsset 0.350*** (3.089) 0.353*** (3.091) 0.364*** (3.210) 
DebtRatio -0.097 (-1.416) -0.103 (-1.549) -0.107 (-1.544) 
DivPayer 0.189*** (5.964) 0.191*** (5.962) 0.189*** (6.002) 
lnAT 0.165*** (3.870) 0.174*** (4.089) 0.169*** (4.015) 
RETE 0.004 (1.038) 0.004 (1.103) 0.004 (0.865) 
ROCAA -1.242*** (-5.365) -1.255*** (-5.407) -1.235*** (-5.344)
CapExp 0.935** (2.495) 0.895** (2.372) 0.963** (2.564) 
lnMV -0.288*** (-5.546) -0.288*** (-5.480) -0.289*** (-5.569)
BTM 117.054** (2.237) 100.719** (2.051) 115.317** (2.200) 
ROA 7.454*** (8.686) 7.479*** (8.724) 7.493*** (8.734) 
Follow 0.256*** (9.444) 0.250*** (9.150) 0.247*** (9.598) 
DaysFF -0.035*** (-3.409) -0.033*** (-3.269) -0.035*** (-3.434)
DaysLF 0.001 (0.077) 0.001 (0.081) 0.001 (0.090) 
numFORE -0.031* (-1.887) -0.029* (-1.753) -0.032* (-1.934) 
lnExperience -0.000 (-0.075) -0.000 (-0.004) -0.001 (-0.198) 
lnBrokerSize 0.033*** (4.624) 0.032*** (4.505) 0.033*** (4.598) 
GDPG 0.018* (1.948) 0.018* (1.877) 0.017* (1.853) 
tb3ms 0.672 (0.290) 1.710 (0.740) 0.935 (0.404) 
IND Year Qtr FE YES YES YES 
Firm Cluster YES YES YES 
N 529,599 528,716 531,598 
Adj. R2 0.729 0.729 0.730 
Table 9 shows the results of analysts’ share adjustment behaviors after the actual repurchase shares become 
available. Model 1 examines the actual shares repurchased during quarter t (RepShare), and how analysts 
adjust their EPS forecasts for quarter t+1 based on the actual repurchases released in firms’ earnings 
announcements. Model 2 and Model 3 examines whether analysts make regular estimations of the shares to 
be repurchased based on the two-stage repurchase estimation model used in Hribar et al. (2006) and based 
on firms’ previous quarter’s repurchased shares, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. The 
numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics. t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. 
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Figure 2  EPS Revision Timeline – Around Earnings Announcement 
Figure 2 shows the timeline this study uses to define analysts’ EPS forecast revisions around earnings announcement dates and to estimate the shares to be 
repurchased for the forecast period t+2. It takes the last EPS forecast before the earnings announcements (EPS_PreEarnAnn) and the first EPS forecast after 
the earnings announcements (EPS_PostEarnAnn) to calculate the EPS forecast revisions (ForecastREV_EarnAnn). To keep only the analysts that are 
actively following the repurchase firm, I require the last EPS forecasts before the earnings announcement to be within 90 days; to mitigate the influence of 
the confounding events on analysts’ EPS forecast revisions, I require the first EPS forecast after the earnings announcement to be within 30 days after the 
announcement. 
EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1 EPSt
Announcement
EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 
Less than 90 days Less than 30 days 
EPSt–1
Announcement 
EPSt+1
Announcement 
Pricet–1 
MVt–1
ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1 = (EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 – EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1) / Pricet–1  
RepSharet = Number of Shares Repurchasedt 
NIREV_EarnAnnt+1 = [EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 × (ShareOutt–1 – RepSharet) – EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1 × ShareOutt–1] / MVt–1 
ExpRepShareModelt UnExpRepShareModelt
ExpRepShareModelt+1 UnExpRepShareModelt+1
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines analysts’ EPS denominator forecast behaviors using the 
repurchase announcement setting. The main findings are as follows. First, analysts revise 
their estimates of the outstanding shares downward when they make EPS forecasts, based 
on the expected shares to be repurchased during the analysts’ forecast periods. Moreover, 
when a repurchase announcement has a high common uncertainty, analysts are less likely 
to incorporate the estimated share changes in their forecast in response to the higher 
demand from the market, while the length of the relationship between analysts and firms 
increase the likelihood of the share estimation. Second, this paper finds that impounding 
the shares estimation into EPS forecasts can increase the EPS forecast accuracy, but the 
EPS forecasts increase that is induced by the smaller shares scaler reduces the predictive 
power of analysts’ EPS revisions over a firm’s future operating performance. Third, 
analysts rely more on the actual EPS forecast revisions than on the numerator-driven EPS 
forecast revisions in their target price forecast model, and the market participants fail to 
process the implications of the denominator-driven EPS forecasts. Taking long and short 
positions in the top and bottom quintile portfolios based on the denominator-driven EPS 
forecasts incurs economically significant abnormal returns.  
This paper focuses on the one-quarter-ahead EPS forecast because this forecast 
horizon is relevant to the most recent forecast period and is widely used by the market. 
Analysts provide forecasts for different forecast horizons, from one to four quarters ahead 
quarterly forecasts to multiple future years’ yearly forecasts. The shorter the period after 
firms announce repurchases, the smaller the number of shares is to be repurchased. 
Therefore, the one-quarter-ahead horizon has the lowest power finding analysts estimating 
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shares to be repurchased in the forecast quarter. Therefore, the results found in this forecast 
horizon can be generalized to other longer forecast horizons. 
This paper contributes to the understanding to an analysts’ forecast feature about 
their estimations of the EPS denominator, which is not covered by the prior literature. It 
also shows the importance of knowing this feature by comparing the information content 
of the EPS revisions before and after removing the repurchase induced EPS revisions. 
Based on the empirical evidence, this paper argues that EPS forecast number providers 
should report both the numerator and the denominator components of the EPS forecast, 
especially after the events that may change the number of outstanding shares. The EPS 
forecast users should also be aware of how much of the EPS change is because of the share 
changes when they utilize analyst EPS forecasts in making investment decisions.  
This paper also has implications for future research. First, prior literature provides 
mixed evidence regarding whether analysts revise their EPS forecasts upward or downward 
after repurchase announcements. The summary statistics in this study reveal that the 
numerator-driven EPS forecast revisions are significantly more negative than the actual 
EPS forecast revisions, which reveals a possibility of using the numerator-driven EPS 
forecast revisions to reconcile those mixed findings. Second, there is a widely established 
literature finding firms opportunistically repurchase shares in order to increase their actual 
EPS to meet or beat analysts’ EPS forecast targets (e.g., Hribar et al. (2006)). Since this 
study finds that analysts already make shares adjustment in their EPS forecasts, future 
study can examine whether it is the unexpected repurchases, or the difference between the 
actual repurchases and the estimable repurchases, drive the possibility of using repurchases 
to meet or beat earnings targets. Third, both the practice and academia have been criticizing 
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repurchase firms for spending money on repurchases instead of on investing in 
employment and potential projects. Moreover, many firms borrow money to repurchase 
and even financially constraint firms also conduct repurchases, which is inconsistent with 
the regular conditions for repurchase firms. Based on the results of this study, I propose a 
possibility that since analysts expect actual repurchases after repurchase announcements 
by upwardly adjusting their EPS forecasts, the repurchase announcing firms may be 
pressured to conduct repurchases to meet analysts’ expectations, even when they are not in 
the best condition to conduct repurchases. Furthermore, as discussed in this study, it is 
difficult for the general market to estimate a firm’s actual repurchase implementation 
before earnings or 10Q/10K is released. Future studies can examine management earnings 
guidance for repurchase announcing firms and discover whether the guidance provides any 
information that can help market participants predict firms’ repurchase implementation. 
Researchers can also investigate whether analysts’ share adjustment behaviors are 
influenced by firms’ earnings announcement guidance.  
Finally, one limitation of this study is that as mentioned in many prior research, 
analyst forecast behaviors are black boxes. Because I do not have access to the number of 
shares used in individual analysts’ EPS forecasts, I constructed a measure to estimate the 
shares used in their forecasts. Although I use a small sample to validate this share 
estimation measure, it will be more convincing if future studies can get individual analysts’ 
EPS forecast reports and find out the actual number of shares used in their forecasts. Also, 
if researchers can get access to real analysts and conduct surveys, they can ask them the 
share-estimation related questions to validate the preliminary evidence of analysts’ share 
forecast behaviors found in this study. Even with the limitation, this study takes the first 
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step and brings out an area that researchers can study and market participants should take 
into account when they make investment decisions. 
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APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables Definition DataSource 
Dependent Variables 
EPS_PreRepAnnt The last quarterly EPS forecast before the repurchase 
announcement date (within 90 days before the 
announcement date) for quarter t. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
EPS_PostRepAnnt The first quarterly EPS forecast after the repurchase 
announcement date (within 30 days after the announcement 
date) for quarter t. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
NDEPS_PostRepAnnt Numerator-driven first EPS forecast after the repurchase 
announcement date = EPS_PostRepAnnt * (ShareOutt-1 – 
ExpRepSharet) / ShareOutt-1. ShareOut and ExpRepShare 
are defined in the Main Independent Variable section. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
ForecastREVt Actual analyst EPS forecast revisions after the repurchase 
announcement = [(EPS_PostRepAnnt – EPS_PreRepAnnt) / 
Pricet–1] ×1,000, where Pricet–1 is stock price at the end of 
quarter t–1. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
NDForecastREVt Numerator-driven analyst EPS forecast revisions after the 
repurchase announcement = [(NDEPS_PostRepAnnt – 
EPS_PreRepAnnt) / Pricet–1] ×1,000 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
Distortiont EPS forecast distortion = Denominator-driven forecast 
revisions = (EPS_PostRepAnnt – 
NDEPS_PostRepAnnt)/Pricet-1. 
Compustat 
ROAt+n Future ROA during the n quarters after repurchase 
announcements, where n = 0, 1, 2, 3. ROA = operating 
income / total assets.  
Compustat 
EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1 The last quarterly EPS forecast before the earnings 
announcement date (within 90 days before the 
announcement date) for quarter t+1. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 The first quarterly EPS forecast after the earnings 
announcement date (within 30 days after the announcement 
date) for quarter t+1. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
ForecastREV_EarnAnnt+1 Analyst EPS forecast revision after the earnings 
announcement =  [(EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 – 
EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1) / Pricet–1] × 1,000, where Pricet–1 is 
stock price at the end of quarter t–1. 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
PriceREVt Target price revision = first price forecast after the 
repurchase announcement minus the last price forecast 
before the repurchase announcement, divided by the 
beginning-of-quarter stock price (Pricet–1).  
I/B/E/S 
RecomREVt Recommendation revision = first recommendation after the 
repurchase announcement minus the last recommendation 
before the repurchase announcement, times (-1).  
I/B/E/S 
Return[m1~mn] Abnormal buy-and-hold returns from 1 to n months after 
analyst release the first forecast after repurchase 
announcements, where n = 3, 6, 9, 12. Abnormal returns = 
buy-and-hold returns – equal weighted returns.   
CRSP 
PerfectREVt Perfect revision after a repurchase announcement = actual 
EPS – EPS_PreRepAnnt. 
I/B/E/S 
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APPENDIX A Continued 
Variables Definition DataSource 
Main Independent Variables 
RepSharet Number of shares repurchased in quarter t. Compustat 
Announced Sharest Announced number of shares to be repurchased in an 
repurchase announcement in quarter t. 
SDC 
Completion Ratiot Completion ratio = cumulative repurchase-completion ratio 
at the forecast quarter end date. Completion ratio is based on 
the completion schedule from a firm’s previous repurchase 
announcement. First-time repurchasers follow the 
completion schedule based on their industry average 
repurchase-completion ratios in the year before the 
repurchase announcement. 
SDC 
ExpRepSharet Analysts’ expected number of shares to be repurchased after 
a repurchase announcement = Announced Sharest × 
Completion Ratiot.  
Compustat, 
CRSP, 
SDC 
UnExpRepSharet Unexpected number of shares repurchased = RepSharet – 
ExpRepSharet. 
Compustat 
NIREVt Net income revision after a repurchase announcement = 
{[EPS_PostRepAnnt × (ShareOutt–1 – ExpRepSharet) – 
EPS_PreRepAnnt × ShareOutt–1] / MVt–1} × 1,000,000, 
where ShareOutt–1 is the number of common shares 
outstanding at quarter t–1 and adds dilution effect for 
analysts reporting diluted EPS forecasts, and MVt–1 is the 
market value of common equity at quarter t–1. Dilution 
effect is calculated as the difference between the common 
shares used in the diluted EPS calculation and the common 
shares used in the basic EPS calculation.
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
lnDaysFollowt-1 The relationship between an analyst and the manager = 
natural log of the number of days in which the analyst 
follows the firm as of quarter t-1.  
I/B/E/S 
OverallUncertt-1 Overall uncertainty that includes the common uncertainty 
(CommonUncertt) and the uncertainty related to analysts’ 
private information following Barron et al. (1998) and 
Lehavy et al. (2011) = (1 – 1/NumAnalyst) × Dispersion + 
Accuracy. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts after repurchase announcements.  
I/B/E/S 
CommonUncertt-1 Common uncertainty of a repurchase announcement that is 
the same to all analyst following Barron et al. (1998) and 
Lehavy et al. (2011) = Accuracy –  Dispersion/NumAnalyst. 
I/B/E/S 
AnalystUncertt-1 Idiosyncratic uncertainty related to the private information 
from analysts = OverallUncertt - CommonUncertt
I/B/E/S 
ExpRepShareModelt The predicted repurchase dollar value using the two-stage 
prediction model following Hribar et al. (2006) divided by 
price. Negative expected repurchases are replaced by 0.  
Compustat, 
CRSP, 
SDC 
UnExpRepShareModelt Unexpected number of shares repurchased from model 
estimation = RepSharet – ExpRepShareModelt. 
Compustat 
NIREV_EarnAnnt+1 Net income revision after an earnings announcement = 
{[EPS_PostEarnAnnt+1 × (ShareOutt–1 – RepSharet) – 
EPS_PreEarnAnnt+1 × ShareOutt–1] / MVt–1} × 1,000,000, 
where ShareOutt–1 is the number of common shares 
outstanding at quarter t–1 and MVt–1 is the market value of 
common equity at quarter t–1. 
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
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APPENDIX A Continued 
Variables Definition DataSource 
Control Variables – all control variables in models are lagged variables in quarter t-1 
CashAssett-1 Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets 
(Compustat data item “cheq” divided by “atq”) 
Compustat 
DebtRatiot-1 The sum of short-term debt (Compustat data item “dlcq”) 
and long term debt (“dlttq”) divided by total assets (“atq”). 
Compustat 
Div/Pricet-1 Common stock dividends per share (Compustat data item 
“dvpspq”) divided by the price per share (“prccq”) 
Compustat 
DivPayert-1 An indicator variable equal to one if the one-quarter-lagged 
Div/Price ratio for a particular firm is greater than zero (and 
zero otherwise) 
Compustat 
LogATt-1 The natural log of firm assets (Compustat data item “atq”) Compustat 
RETEt-1 Retained earnings (Compustat data item “req”) divided by 
total equity (Compustat data item “teqq”) 
Compustat 
ROCAAt-1 Return on Cash-Adjusted Assets; Operating income 
(Compustat data item “oibdpq”) divided by average assets 
less cash and cash equivalents (average of “atq” over the 
current quarter minus the average of “cheq” over the current 
quarter)).  
Compustat 
CapExpt-1 The sum of all capital expenditures (Compustat data item 
“capxq”) over the prior four quarters divided by average 
assets less cash and cash equivalents (average of “atq” over 
the current quarter minus the average of “cheq” over the 
current quarter)) over the prior four quarters. 
Compustat 
LogMVt-1 Natural log of the market value of equity = Log((prc/cfacpr) 
×(shrout/cfacshr)) 
Compustat 
BTMt-1 Book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity. Compustat 
ROAt-1 Earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. = 
ibq/atq 
Compustat 
FOLLOWt-1 Natural log of analyst coverage. I/B/E/S 
numFOREt-1 Natural log of the number of times the analyst forecasted 
the previous quarter's earnings. 
I/B/E/S 
DaysFFt-1 
(DaysLFt-1) 
Natural log of the number of days between the analyst's 
final (first) forecast of the current quarter's earnings and the 
current quarter's earnings announcement. 
I/B/E/S 
Experiencet-1 Natural log of the number of years since the analyst's first 
forecast in I/B/E/S. 
I/B/E/S 
BrokerSizet-1 Natural log of the number of analysts at the analyst's 
brokerage. 
I/B/E/S 
FpedatsGapt-1 Natural log of the number of days between the repurchase 
announcement date and forecast period end date 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC 
GDPGt-1 Real GDP growth over the one-year-ahead quarter FRED 
tb3mst-1 3-month treasury bill rate FRED 
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